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DEREGULATORY MYOPIA:

SACRIFICING

THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE AND

RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE
RATEMAKING TO PROMOTE
COMPETITION IN GAS MARKETS
by
Daniel Watkiss*

ROMOTING competition in the sales market for natural gas has
been the premier goal of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC)1 since Congress partially deregulated the wellhead market
for gas in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA). 2 A large cost obstructing transition from a pervasively regulated to a competitive wellhead
market is the nearly $8 billion in unpaid liabilities3 that most of the twentysix major interstate natural gas pipelines currently owe gas producers pursuant to take-or-pay terms in long-term gas sales contracts.4 The success and
* A.B., Stanford University; J.D., University of Utah. Attorney, Powell, Goldstein,
Frazer & Murphy, Washington, D.C.
1. The FERC is successor to the Federal Power Commission (FPC), 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)
(1982). The FPC's functions were transferred to the FERC on October 1, 1977, pursuant to
§ 401 of the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
See Exec. Order No. 12,009, 3 C.F.R. 142 (1977), reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 7341 note (1982),
revoked Exec. Order No. 12,553, 3 C.F.R. 204 (1986) (resetting effective date). The FERC is
the regulatory agency with jurisdiction to set rates for interstate natural gas pipelines, electric
utilities, and oil pipelines, and certify or license natural gas facilities and hydro-electric
projects. 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1982).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982 & Supp.
1985)). See generally Pierce, Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978-Change, Complexity, and a
Major New Role for the KCC, 47 J. KAN. B.A. 259, 261-62 (1978) (discussing federal regulation under NGPA); Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas PolicyAct: Title 1, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 101, 107 (1980) (guiding purpose of NGPA was protection of natural gas consumers).
For an overview of the FERC deregulatory initiatives since passage of the NGPA, see Pierce,
Reconstituting the NaturalGas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1, 22-51
(1988) [hereinafter Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip]; S. WILLIAMS, THE NATURAL GAS
REVOLUTION OF 1985, at 15-17 (1985). The effects of those initiatives on natural gas pipelines
is reviewed in Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 204-06 (5th Cir. 1988);
Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1468-69, 99 L. Ed. 2d 698-99 (1988); Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1151 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1114 (1986).
3. INGAA, The Unrelenting Take-or-Pay Problem: Year-End 1987 Exposure and Costs
(April 1988) (reporting exposure of $7.4 billion at year-end 1987; $10 billion in 1986; $6.1
billion in 1985; and $4.7 billion in 1984); cf Pipelines' Take or Pay Costs Continue to Mount,
Oil & Gas J., Aug. 10, 1987, at 20 (forecasting $11.7 billion in liabilities by end of 1987).
4. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 976-79 (7th ed.
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timing of the FERC's program to promote gas sales competition now turns
largely on how and if the FERC and the courts permit the pipelines to recover take-or-pay liabilities. That question has pitted each segment of the
gas industry against the others, all hoping that the take-or-pay burden falls
elsewhere.
The FERC's solution, set forth in its recent Order No. 500,1 is an unlawful retroactive rate that squarely contravenes two foundations of utility
ratemaking: the filed rate doctrine and the rule against retroactive ratemaking. 6 Order No. 500 and its initial applications by the FERC also put the
1987) (defining take-or-pay terms). Producers and purchasers commonly enter long-term contracts with take-or-pay provisions because of the substantial investment that both gas producers and natural gas pipelines make in production and transmission plant, and because of the
long-term service requirements of the pipelines. See Pierce, NaturalGas Regulation, Deregulation and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 77-82 (1982). Typically, the amount of gas that the
purchaser, usually a pipeline, must take from a producer or pay for is a percentage of either a
fixed volume or the rate of deliverable production at the wellhead. The following clause illustrates the deliverability based take-or-pay clause that predominated since the early 1970s.
Buyer agrees to purchase and receive from Seller or to pay for if available but
not taken, a quantity of gas equal to the sum of the Daily Contract Quantities
herein specified. . . . The Daily Contract Quantity shall be the daily rate of
production equal to seventy-five percent (75%) of the Delivery Capacity of each
well.
Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, Take or Litigate: Enforcing the Plain Meaning of the Take-orPay Clause in NaturalGas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. REV. 185, 187 (1986). "[T]he true effect of
the take-or-pay clause is to assign the risk of a deteriorating natural gas market to the pipeline." Id. at 188; see also International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879,
882 (10th Cir. 1985) (take-or-pay reduces producer investment risk), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1015 (1986). In December 1982, the FERC announced that it would prospectively deem takeor-pay prepayments under requirements exceeding 75% of annual deliverability unjust and
unreasonable and would not allow those prepayments into the rate base. Take-or-Pay Provisions in Gas Purchase Contracts; Statement of Policy, 47 Fed. Reg. 57,268 (Dec. 23, 1982)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. § 2.103 (1988)), reprinted in [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C.
Stats. & Regs. 30,409; see Doane, Take-or-Pay: FERC's Regulatory Dilemma, 2 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1987, at 20. Producers and purchasers executed the majority of
existing take-or-pay contracts during a severe shortage of deliverable gas in the 1970s. See
Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 768, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
5. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Interim Rule
and Statement of Policy, Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987) [hereinafter Order No.
500] (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 84) reprintedin [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C.
Stats. & Regs. 30,761, modified, Order No. 500-B, 52 Fed. Reg. 39,630 (1987), reprinted in
[Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,772, modified, Order No. 500-C, 52
Fed. Reg. 48,986 (1987) reprinted in [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs.
30,786, reh'g denied, Order No. 500-E, 53 Fed. Reg. 16,859 (1988), 43 F.E.R.C.
61,234
(1988), petition for review docketed sub nom. Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, No. 87-1588
(D.C. Cir.). Order No. 500 is the FERC's response to the court's decision, also styled in
Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), in which the court vacated
and remanded the FERC's Order No. 436. Id. at 1044. See Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985) [hereinafter Order No. 436] (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 157, 250, 284, 375, 381), reprinted in
[Regs. Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,665, modified, Order No. 436-A, 50
Fed. Reg. 52,217 (1985) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 157, 284, 375, reprinted in [Regs.
Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,675, modified further, Order No. 436-B, 51
Fed. Reg. 6398 (1986) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284), reprinted in [Regs. Preambles
1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,688, reh'g denied, Order No. 436-C, 34 F.E.R.C.
61,404, applicationsfor reh'g denied, Order No. 436-D, 34 F.E.R.C. 61,405, reconsideration
denied, Order No. 436-E, 34 F.E.R.C. 61,403 (1986).
6. For definitions and analysis of the doctrine and rule, see infra text accompanying
notes 39-41, 59-92.
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FERC and its deregulatory programs onto a collision course with the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Earlier this
year, in Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. FERC (Columbia),7 the D.C.
Circuit struck and remanded a FERC decision that, like Order No. 500,
would have permitted pipelines to bill customers directly for certain gas production costs in proportion to purchases those customers made during a past
period even though nothing in the pipelines' then-filed tariff informed gas
customers of the upcoming retroactive charge.8 Order No. 500 and its application in several FERC decisions are currently pending appeal to the D.C.
Circuit.
This Article explains that the conflict in Columbia grew out of the
FERC's delay in promulgating certain regulations needed to implement the
phased wellhead deregulation program that Congress enacted in the
NGPA. 9 A second and more consequential conflict grows out of the
FERC's current effort in Order No. 500 to reinterpret and limit the prohibition on retroactive ratemaking, not only to save Order No. 500, but also to
redeem the FERC's efforts to promote competitive gas pricing and its "openaccess" transportation rule. The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded the
open-access rule, embodied in the FERC's Order No. 436, precisely because
of the FERC's failure to address the multi-billion dollar take-or-pay liabilities that natural gas pipelines owe to gas producers. I0
In a larger context, one can view the FERC's resort to retroactive
ratemaking as the result of the FERC's piecemeal efforts to restructure and
partially deregulate the natural gas sales market at the pipeline level only,
without regard for the consequences of that restructuring upstream at the
gas wellhead or downstream in local distribution and end-use markets.II If
the FERC persists, it will invite yet another judicial reversal, prolonging the
take-or-pay problem, and further delaying realization of competitive wellhead gas markets. This Article concludes with a discussion of ratemaking
7. 831 F.2d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1987), modified on reh'g, 844 F.2d 879 (1988).
8. 831 F.2d at 1142.

9. See id. at 1137-38.
10. See Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1044.
11. The natural gas industry has three primary segments: (1) producers explore for, locate, and extract gas from gas fields; (2) natural gas pipelines purchase gas from producers,
process the gas, and transport the gas to local distribution companies or directly to industrial
end users and residential gas consumers; and (3) local gas distribution companies purchase gas

from the natural gas pipelines, or occasionally from producers directly, for resale to residential, commercial, or industrial consumers within their local market areas. See generally McDONALD, NATURAL GAS: THE NECESSITY OF DEREGULATION 5-6 (1982). Ordinarily,

ownership of gas passes from producer to natural gas pipeline to local distributor or end user
at each transfer. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural
Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 348 (1983). The FERC's jurisdiction to promote competitive gas sales market is limited and cannot directly reach local markets. Many local regula-

tors insist that their local distributors receive open access to pipeline facilities at the same time
that the regulators erect barriers preventing pipelines from competing with their local distribu-

tor for sales. See National Steel Corp. v. Long, 689 F. Supp. 729, 737 (W.D. Mich. 1988)
(holding that federal jurisdiction under the NGA preempted the Michigan Legislature's enactment intended to regulate locally the access of Michigan direct purchasers to interstate pipeline sellers).
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alternatives that could lawfully achieve the same goals that motivated the
FERC to implement unlawful retroactive rates in Order No. 500.
I.

PRELUDE TO THE PROBLEM

The current take-or-pay debacle grows out of the period immediately preceding and following enactment of the NGPA. During that period the interstate pipelines, as the nation's predominant merchants of gas and gas
transportation to residential, commercial, and other end-use markets, aggressively purchased gas deliverability at the wellhead to replenish deliverability stocks that had fallen to historical lows during the mid-to-late
1970s. 12 Curtailment of services to many gas markets caused by the low
deliverability stocks.exposed pipelines to suits for breach of contract 13 and to
the indignation of politicians and local regulators. 14 Pipelines reacted by
purchasing too much gas deliverability. 15 At the same time, wellhead sellers
answered the bullish demand for gas with excessive prices and unreasonably
16
high minimum-take contract requirements.
Soon after enactment of the NGPA, this seller's market collapsed in economic recessions, 17 the collapse of oil prices, restricted gas demand,1 8 and
12. Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1149-52 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Subcommittee

on IntergovernmentalRelations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, the Status of the Nation's Preparednessfor the Winter of 1977-78, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977); S. BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 244-53 (1982); see also FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
406 U.S. 621, 626 n.2 (1972) (quoting an FPC Statement that reported 10.3% drop in proven
reserves of gas in lower 48 states between 1967 and 1970); Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural
Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARv. L. REV. 941, 965-67
(1973) (analyzing gas shortages in 1971 and 1972 and predicting future shortages). In fact, the
shortfall of deliverability that tormented natural gas markets in the winter of 1976-77 ended by
1978 when the NGPA was enacted. See Existing Plants Using Natural Gas Freed of NearTerm Fuel Switching Mandate, 1978 ENERGY USERS REPORT (BNA) 6 (Nov. 16, 1978) (recognizing gas surplus of one trillion cubic feet).
13. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 417, 425-30 (5th Cir. 1987) (certificate or tariff no bar to fault-based liability); Note, ContractualLiability of Pipelinesfor Damages Caused by Gas Supply Curtailments: Texasgulf, Inc. v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 6
ENERGY L.J. 281, 287-89, 290-95 (1985) (discussing pipeline's duty of care); cf Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Co., Opinion No. 249, 36 F.E.R.C. 61,071, at 61,174 (1986) (rejecting defense of
fixed cost minimum commodity based on certificate since pipeline "faces no penalty for failure
to meet its customer's [sic] contract requirements"); cf Rossin v. Southern Union Gas Co.,
472 F.2d 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1973) (rejecting absolute liability for utility's failure to provide
service).
14. Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1027 (Pipelines "caught in an unusual transition.
They entered into now uneconomic contracts in an era when government officials berated pipeline management for failures of supply and constantly predicted energy price escalations.").
15. See Doane, supra note 4, at 18; Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 2, at 14.
16. See Threadgill, Anticompetitive Abuse by Producers Under the Natural Gas Policy Act,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 3, 1988, at 15, 16-18 (alleging producer abuses and anticompetitive
provisions in wellhead sales contracts entered between 1979 and 1982).
17. See generally Maryland People's Counsel v FERC (MPC-1), 761 F.2d 768, 771 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Doane, supra note 4, at 14; Pierce, supra note 11, at 352. The Energy Information
Administration (EIA) recently concluded that existing take-or-pay liabilities present a problem
"so widespread that it is likely to be more related to universal factors affecting the industry
than to any choices made by the [pipeline] companies." EIA, NATURAL GAS MONTHLY, Apr.
1, 1988, at 14 [hereinafter EIA].
18. A companion statute to the NGPA, the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42, 45, 49
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take-or-pay liability began to climb inexorably as pipelines were unable to
market gas up to their minimum wellhead take obligations. Gas prices,
however, did not follow the downward path of demand.1 9 The incongruence
of price and demand demonstrated that wellhead gas markets had become
price-insensitive due to the rigid gas pricing categories of the NGPA 20 and
other regulatory barriers to competitive gas purchasing, including the mo-

2
nopoly or monopsony control pipelines exerted over gas transmission. 1
The FERC responded to this changing market by promoting special gas
marketing programs that, until stricken by the courts, allowed limited competitive pricing and sales of over-abundant pipeline supplies to the pipelines'
noncaptive markets. 22 At the same time, the FERC focused on changing the
relationships between pipelines and their purchasers, predominantly local
distributors. First, it promulgated Order No. 380,23 in which it used its authority under sections 424 and 525 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA) to strike
from pipeline tariffs variable-cost minimum commodity bills, which in a
manner similar to take-or-pay requirements forced purchasers to pay a portion of gas supply charges even for gas not actually taken. 26 The intended
U.S.C.) restricted permissible uses of natural gas. See Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra
note 2, at 11.

19. See
ENERGY,

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, SAFETY

& ENVIRONMENT, U.S.

INCREASING COMPETITION IN THE NATURAL GAS MARKET:

DEP'T OF

THE SECOND RE-

123 OF THE NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT of 1978, at 8, table 1-3,
17 (DOE/PE-0069 Jan. 1985).
20. See Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 205 (5th Cir. 1988) (cases
cited therein); Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC (MPC-I1), 761 F.2d 780, 781 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
21. See Wagner & Brown, 837 F.2d at 205; Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 2, at
15-16, 22-24.
22. These programs, which came to be known as special marketing programs or SMPs,
created dual pipeline sales markets in which the pipelines could selectively discount gas sales
or transportation to price-sensitive and fuel-switchable customers while continuing to bill fully
allocated rates to captive customers. See Nowak & Leitch, Maryland People's Counsel.k Will It
Spur Changes in FERC's Regulation of the NaturalGas Industry?, 6 ENERGY L.J. 265, 267-72
(1985); Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 2, at 24. In companion cases, two panels of
the court held that, by creating two classes of customers with substantially different access to
regulated gas supply, the SMPs violated the NGA's prohibition on undue discrimination.
MPC-I, 761 F.2d at 772; MPC-II, id. at 781-82.
23. Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Minimum Commodity Bill
Provisions, Order No. 380, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (1984) [hereinafter Order No. 380] (codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 154), reprintedin [1982-1985 Regs. Preambles] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,571,
aff'd sub nom. Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1114 (1986). See generally Note, Elimination of Variable Costs from Natural
Gas Minimum Bills: Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 7 ENERGY L.J. 131 (1986).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1982).
25. Id. § 717d.
26. A minimum commodity bill requires a pipeline customer to pay a commodity charge,
either variable or fixed components, irrespective of whether the customer actually purchases
and takes delivery of any gas. E.g., Wisconsin Gas Co., 770 F.2d at 1150; Mississippi River
Trans. Corp. v. FERC, 759 F.2d 945, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1985). It is "a type of contractual
take-or-pay arrangement between a pipeline and its customer, whereby the customer is obligated to take a minimum amount of gas or else pay for the variable [or fixed] cost of the gas
not taken." Doane, supra note 4, at 20. Distinct from a minimum bill is a minimum take
requirement, which obliges a customer actually to take delivery and pay. Like the take-or-pay
clause in upstream wellhead contracts, the minimum bill shifts the risk of a deteriorating natural gas market downstream. Cf Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, supra note 4, at 188 (discussing
PORT REQUIRED BY SECTION
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and actual result of Order No. 380 was to increase the flexibility of downstream gas consumers, enabling them to purchase from gas suppliers other
than their traditional pipeline gas merchants. 27 The unintended, although

foreseeable, result of Order No. 380 was to decrease demand for the pipelines' gas, which exacerbated their take-or-pay exposure at the wellhead.
Order No. 380 represented only part of the FERC's deregulatory equation. Because the pipelines are contract carriers 28 under the NGA, and not
common carriers, which are accessible to all customers at nondiscriminatory
tariff rates, the pipelines remained largely free to refuse to transport for customers who had used their new flexibility under Order No. 380 to buy gas
from competing gas sellers. The FERC responded in 1985 with its "openaccess transportation" proposal in Order No. 436,29 which cajoles but does
not force pipelines to assume "open-access" carriage, allowing all gas sellers
to compete head on with the pipelines and then use the pipelines' transportation system to get their gas to markets. The pipelines' acquiescence to Order
No. 436 could only further reduce traditional pipeline sales, 30 exacerbating
take-or-pay liabilities that had already soared into the billions of dollars.
Accordingly, the pipelines only grudgingly acceded to Order No. 436.31
Many local distribution companies and their state regulators did not help
this situation. Notwithstanding declining real demand for gas in their markets, the local distribution customers of the pipelines, often under pressure
from local regulators, have required the pipelines to hold unrealistically high
risk shift under take-or-pay clause). Order No. 380 invalidated only the variable cost component of minimum commodity bills; in later individual rate hearings the FERC eliminated the
fixed component of most pipeline minimum bills. E.g., Trunkline Gas Co., Opinion No. 297,
42 F.E.R.C. 61,201, at 61,699 (1988); East Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 41 F.E.R.C.
61,165, at 61,421 (1987); KN Energy, 40 F.E.R.C. 61,263, at 61,873 (1987); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., Opinion No. 260-A, 40 F.E.R.C. 61,188, at 61,592 (1987). At least
one federal district court has found that, under a specific contract, Order No. 380 was an
unforeseeable event, constituting force majeur and excusing the pipeline purchaser from the
take-or-pay liability. Burkhart Petroleum Corp. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 87-C-257-C (N.D.
Okla. June 30, 1988).
27. See Wisconsin Gas Co., 770 F.2d at 1151; Order No. 380, supra note 23, 49 Fed. Reg.
22,782-83, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,961-63; Doane, supra
note 4, at 21.
28. Congress rejected proposals that would have made the gas pipelines into common
carriers, like oil pipelines. Instead, it adopted in the NGA a public utility regulatory scheme
under which pipelines retained control over customers they would contract with, subject to
restrictions prohibiting undue discrimination or preference between those customers to the
extent the customers were similarly situated. See Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 997.
29. FERC found in Order No. 436 that pipelines were discriminatorily denying to transport gas in competition with their own gas sales. Since pipelines control an essential facility,
these denials were unduly discriminatory and preferential under the NGA. Based on that
finding, Order No. 436 makes available procedures for obtaining transportation service certificates on condition that a pipeline make its capacity available to anyone who requests transportation, including competitors in the sales market and their customers. Order No. 436, supra
note 5, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 31,495.
30. See Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 2, at 35-36.
31. See Griggs, Restructuringthe Natural Gas Industry: OrderNo. 436 and Other Regulatory Initiatives, 7 ENERGY L.J. 71, 97 (1986) (few major pipelines are operating as "openaccess" transporters under permanent tariffs today); see also Doane, supra note 4, at 21; Pierce,
supra note 2, at 35.
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levels of gas deliverability subject to take-or-pay obligations. 32 At the same
time, the distribution companies and their regulators have often led the
charge to free the local companies to buy gas from sellers rather than the
traditional pipeline suppliers. 33 This local perspective illustrates that the
players in local markets want to retain the traditional security of a pipeline
gas supplier, which assuages the politically understandable fear of a recurrence of the gas shortages of the 1970s, while at the same time they insist
that the traditional pipeline supplier's sales market be exposed to increasing
competition and, ipso facto, less security.
In Associated Gas Distributorsv. FERC 34 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit largely affirmed the coercive, but
not mandatory, open-access carriage scheme of Order No. 436. 35 The court
nevertheless vacated and remanded that order with instructions that the
FERC either act or explain its inaction regarding the burgeoning take-orpay liabilities that Orders No. 380 and No. 436 had exacerbated. 36 The
FERC's response, on which the success of its deregulatory initiatives may
now depend, has been to continue to ignore the core of the problem: the
pipelines' post-curtailment gas purchases and the resulting wellhead contracts between the pipelines and wellhead sellers. Instead, the FERC offered
Order No. 500, which permits the pipelines to charge a fixed direct bill of up
to one-half of their take-or-pay costs to downstream customers. 37 The pipe32. Illustrative of the conflicting interests of local distributors and their pipeline suppliers
is the recent decision in National Steel Corp. v. Long, 689 F. Supp. 729 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
The Michigan distribution companies, which had litigated and lobbied extensively to compel
their pipeline suppliers to become open-access transporters of gas that the distribution companies would buy themselves, had obtained protective state legislation that allowed the state of
Michigan to prohibit those pipeline suppliers from bypassing the local distributors and competing for the industrial direct-sales market. The district court, however, invalidated the legislatioi on the grounds that the state's authority was federally preempted in the NGA. Id. at
737; cf.Order No. 436, supra note 6, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,468-69, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 31,571-72 (discussing local opposition to bypass). Traditionally,
the FERC has favored direct sales by local distributors only. See Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co.
v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329, 336 (1951). That policy began to change
around 1986. See IV NATURAL GAS CONTRACTS, Contract Rept. at 2-4 (May 1988).
33. For example, in 1984, the Pennsylvania legislature directed its public utility commission to deny local gas distributors' rate increase applications unless the commission finds that
the "utility is pursuing a least cost fuel procurement policy" including taking all steps "necessary .. .to [obtain] relie[f] from existing [gas supplier] contract terms which are or may be
adverse to the interests of the utility's ratepayers." 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1318(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988); see Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 837 F.2d
600 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding constitutionality of Act 74), petitionfor cert. filed July 15, 1988.
34. 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
35. Id. at 1024 (analogizing pipeline's "choice" under Order No. 436 to that of condemned man choosing between hangman and firing squad).
36. Id. at 1030; see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. FERC, 823 F.2d 630, 640 (D.C. Cir.
1987); EIA, supra note 17, at 4 ("asymmetry of Order No. 380 ... resulted in the pipeline
companies having an increasingly difficult time selling gas that they were obligated to
purchase").
37. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,341, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,784-87. In order to qualify for an Order No. 500 direct bill a
pipeline must become an "open-access" transporter under Order No. 436 and agree to absorb
from 25 to 50% of its take-or-pay settlement costs. Id., 52 Fed. Reg. 30,341-43, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987], F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,784-87. "[T]hen it will be permitted to recover
an equal amount from its customers through a fixed take-or-pay charge." Id., 52 Fed. Reg.
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lines are permitted to charge the downstream customers, not in relation to
current services to those customers, but rather in relation to how much those
customers reduced their pipeline gas purchases during periods up to seven
38
years earlier.
II.

RATE CERTAINTY AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FILED RATE DOCTRINE

The filed rate doctrine is the statutory requirement that "forbids a regulated entity to charge rates for its services other than those properly filed
with [and approved by] the appropriate federal regulatory authority. ' 39 The
rule against retroactive ratemaking enforces the filed rate doctrine by ensuring that the FERC change filed rates only prospectively and by "bar[ring]
.. . the [FERC's] retroactive substitution of an unreasonably high or low
[filed] rate with a [new] just and reasonable rate."4 °
The FERC has traditionally applied the filed rate doctrine and the rule
against retroactive ratemaking in the same manner as the courts, but in Columbia4 1 and Order No. 500 the FERC abandoned the traditional definition
of retroactive ratemaking. The traditional definition focuses on the need of
both regulated sellers and their purchasers to be sure at the time they decide
to sell or buy what price they will actually receive or pay and recognizes the
regulators' need to control monopoly pricing of utility services. These objectives are justified under the rubric of rate certainty. By contrast, the rule as
now viewed by the FERC simply requires that rates only recover "current"
costs. The FERC's view, in effect, simply requires that rates recover costs
42
that, on a cash accounting basis, can be characterized as current.
A.

The Emerging Conflict Between the FERC and the Court

In Columbia the D.C. Circuit struck and remanded five FERC orders issued in 1985 and 1986. 43 The orders authorized five gas pipelines to bill
30,338, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,779. The balance between
25 and 50% "may be billed," to the extent marketable, "through a commodity surcharge, or a
volumetric surcharge on pipeline throughput." Id.
38. Id., 52 Fed. Reg. 30,341-42, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs.
30,785 (adopting Recovery of Take-or-Pay Buy-Out and Buy-Down Costs by Interstate Natu61,230 [hereinafter Proposed
ral Gas Pipelines, Proposed Policy Statement, 38 F.E.R.C.
Policy Statement]).
39. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981); accord Montana-Dakota
Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951). In Arkansas La. Gas Co.
the Court recognized a possible exception where the misconduct of a party to a tariff transaction resulted in a failure to change a filed rate when the change otherwise would have been
permissible. 453 U.S. at 583 n.13. A lower federal court recently concluded that a mere negligent misrepresentation was insufficient to invoke that possible exception. Southern Union Co.
v. FERC, No. 87-1232, slip op. at 12 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 1988).
40. City of Piqua, Ohio v. FERC, 610 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1979); accord Arkansas
La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 578.
41. 831 F.2d at 1135.
42. See Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,347, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,793. The FERC's current definition of retroactive ratemaking as
an accounting rule is analyzed infra text accompanying notes 93-111.
43. 831 F.2d at 1142.
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their customers for the pipelines' payments to gas producers for certain production-related costs" in proportion to the amounts of gas purchased by
those customers during periods up to six years earlier. 4 5 According to the
court, the orders unlawfully imposed rates retroactively in violation of the
46
filed rate doctrine.
The court rejected both of the FERC's defenses: that the orders promoted
equity and that, in any event, the orders did not constitute retroactive
ratemaking because FERC orders issued in 1980 and 1983 had allegedly
given the pipeline customers notice at the time they purchased the gas that
they would later be liable for the production-related costs at issue. The
court did not directly address the FERC's assertion of equity, 47 implying
simply that retroactive rates are inherently inequitable. 48 The court rejected
the FERC's contention that the targeted customers were on notice that past
purchases would later give rise to additional charges for production-related
49
costs, and held that notice must be actual and cannot be imputed.
In stark contrast with the court's analysis in Columbia, the FERC re-

44. "Production-related" is a term of art that describes activities and costs associated with
the extraction of gas at the wellhead as opposed to activities and costs associated with the
transmission, storage, or distribution of gas after it is pumped from underground gas reservoirs. The first step in formulating rates for utility service, functionalization, focuses on this
distinction based on the phase of gas marketing from wellhead to burnertip. For a discussion
of functionalization, see infra text accompanying notes 197, 269-74. Production-related costs
are of regulatory significance under the NGPA because sellers can recover production-related
costs in first sales of gas as an add-on to the otherwise applicable maximum lawful price governing that gas under the NGPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 3319 (1982). As defined in the NGPA,
production-related costs are "any costs of compressing, gathering, processing, treating, liquefying, or transporting such natural gas, or other similar costs, borne by the seller and allowed
for, by rule or order, by the Commission." Id. § 3320(a)(2). At issue in Columbia were compression costs, for which the FERC did not provide a mechanism for recovery until late 1985,
seven years after the NGPA was enacted.
45. The FERC orders provided for billing in proportion to customers' purchases during
the period of 1980 through 1983. The first FERC order that authorized the billing scheme
became a final order in late 1985. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 32 F.E.R.C.
61,230, reh'g and clarificationdenied, 33 F.E.R.C. 61,213 (1985). The FERC soon issued
additional orders authorizing the billing scheme. E.g., Texas E. Trans. Corp., 32 F.E.R.C.
61,493, reh'g denied, 33 F.E.R.C.
61,257 (1985); Texas Gas Trans. Corp., 33 F.E.R.C.
61,032, reh'g denied, 33 F.E.R.C. 61,359 (1985); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 33 F.E.R.C.
61,218 (1985), reh'g denied, 34 F.E.R.C. 61,231 (1986); Trunkline Gas Co., 33 F.E.R.C.
61,217 (1985), reh'g denied, 34 F.E.R.C. 61,021 (1986).
46. 831 F.2d at 1141.
47. The FERC's first line of defense was that the direct bill produced an equitable result:
The Commission . . .determined that allocating these costs to the pipelines'
customers on the basis of volumes purchased at the time the costs were incurred
"will equitably bill customers for the higher amounts they should have paid
based on actual purchases during the past billing periods." This is a sound reason for adopting the direct billing method; thus the Commission's choice of that
method is rationally based.
Id. at 1140 (quoting Brief for FERC at 13). The direct bill, in other words, simply made those
customers who bought gas in the past pay for the compression of that gas just as if compression costs had been billed when the purchases were made.
48. The court passed this argument and went right to the law of the filed rate doctrine.
"[T]he effect of the orders is quite clear: downstream customers are expected to pay a
surcharge, over and above the rates on file at the time of the sale, for gas they had already
purchased." 831 F.2d at 1140.
49. Id.
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cently proposed in its Order No. 500 to allow gas pipelines to bill customers
directly, based on purchasing decisions made by those customers up to seven
years ago, for the costs of settling producer take-or-pay obligations. 50 Even
though Order No. 500 was simply a statement of FERC policy, the FERC
has imposed the take-or-pay direct bill whenever pipelines have sought to
recover their take-or-pay payments outside of their current commodity
charge. 5' Gas pipelines have argued that conventional commodity classification of the take-or-pay payments would render their gas supplies unmarketable. 52 Without endorsing the pipelines' marketability contention,5 3 the
FERC nevertheless continued to authorize the direct bill and has repeatedly
54
denied objections that the direct bill is retroactive.
The FERC's response to the claims of retroactive ratemaking has been
fourfold. First, the FERC contends that it is the date on which a regulated
entity incurs a cost, and not the use of past activities such as purchase decisions as the basis for allocating a direct bill among customers, that determines whether a rate recovering that cost is retroactive. 55 Second, the
FERC has asserted that, even if its take-or-pay direct bill is retroactive, the
billing mechanism is nevertheless justified because the customers targeted by
the direct bill, unlike those customers in Columbia, had actual notice that a
56
later charge would follow when they made their past purchase decisions.
Third, the FERC has intermittently argued that customer purchasing decisions in the past created the pipelines' take-or-pay obligations and, therefore,
past purchases provide the only equitable basis for recovering those costs
from customers. 57 Fourth, and most recently, the FERC argued in Colum50. See infra text accompanying notes 93-101.
51. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("When the agency
applies [a general statement of] the policy in a particular situation, it must be prepared to
support the policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued."). The FERC's exclusive reliance on the Order No. 500 policy statement to decide pending rate cases is currently
being challenged as an improper use of general statements of policy. See Appellant Texas Gas
Transmission Corp.'s Motion for Summary Disposition, Texas Gas Trans. Corp. v. FERC,
No. 88-1167 (D.C. Cir. filed April 14, 1988).
52. Eg., Transwestern Pipeline Co., 40 F.E.R.C. 61,324, at 61,992-94 (1987).
53. See id. at 61,994 ("We find that ... an opportunity [to recover take-or-pay costs] is
provided in our current policy which allows pipelines to include in their commodity rates all
prudently incurred take-or-pay costs."); accord Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg.
30,341, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,785.
54. E.g., Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,341, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,785; United Gas Pipeline Co., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,197, at 61,681
(1988), petitionfor review docketed sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, No. 88-1161
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 29, 1988).
55. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,175, at 61,630 (1980) (proposal to bill
now based on purchase reductions from 1981 to 1984 "does not constitute retroactive ratemaking because it does not seek to recover costs incurred in a prior period"), petition for review
docketed sub nom. Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, No. 88-1388 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 1988);
see also Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,343, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,787 (direct bill is not a retroactive rate because it "would enable
pipelines to recover in their future rates costs which they have actually incurred but have not
recouped").
56. See, e.g., United Gas Pipeline Co., 42 F.E.R.C. at 61,681 (1988); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 42 F.E.R.C. at 61,630 (1988).
57. The FERC has advanced this argument only by implication. For example, in defending the past-purchase-deficiency billing mechanism, the FERC asserted:
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bia, but not in Order No. 500, that section 4(d) of the NGA empowers the
58
FERC to waive the filed rate doctrine.
B. Defining the Issue
To understand why the D.C. Circuit condemned, while the FERC embraced, a rate mechanism that currently bills utility customers based on past
purchasing decisions, the reader must understand the difference between
how the court and the current FERC have defined the rule against retroactive ratemaking. Both the court and the FERC have defined the filed rate
doctrine as a requirement that utilities charge only final rates that the utility
has filed with the regulator and the regulator has approved. The area of the
law in which the court and the current FERC have fundamentally differed
lies in the court's traditional view that the rule against retroactive ratemaking enforces rate certainty by insuring that a purchaser will pay and a utility
seller will collect only the rate on file when the purchase and sale decisions
are made. By requiring that rates be implemented only prospectively, the
rule against retroactive ratemaking preserves the regulator's ability to influence sale and purchase decisions. Retroactive changes in the design of a
rate, on the other hand, come after the fact and thus cannot influence sales
or purchases. The FERC, by contrast, now defines the rule as an accounting
protocol limiting rate recovery to current utility payments, irrespective of
whether the sellers and purchasers knew who would ultimately pay when
they made the sale and purchase decisions.
1. The Regulator's Primary Jurisdiction to Prescribe Rates
for Regulated Services
The filed rate doctrine, which is based on "straightforward principles....
forbids a regulated entity to charge rates for its services other than those
properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory authority." 5 9 In one of
[T]he Commission [does not] believe the [direct billing] proposal unfairly
prejudices parties who followed a least-cost gas purchasing strategy. Commis-

sion actions that enabled pipeline customers to purchase gas from alternative
sources at lower prices may have resulted in an increase in pipeline take-or-pay
obligations.... [I]t is reasonable that the beneficiaries of Commission initiatives
to increase competition in the natural gas industry should share in the transition
costs [of] .. .the industry's restructuring.
Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,343, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C.
Stats. & Regs. at 30,787 (emphasis added). The FERC has implied that this purported causeand-effect relationship is the basis for past-purchase-deficiency billing. Id., 52 Fed. Reg.
30,345, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,791 ("allocation of take-orpay costs [should] reflect the causation of the ... costs"). At the same time, the FERC has
conceded that it had not and could not show specific and quantifiable cause-and-effect relations. See id., 52 Fed. Reg. 30,337, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at
30,778-79; El Paso Natural Gas Co., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,024, at 61,148 (1988); Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Co., 40 F.E.R.C.
63,008, at 65,082 (1987) ("difficult, if not impossible, to trace
directly a particular take-or-pay obligation to a particular customer").
58. Columbia Gas Trans. Corp. v. FERC, 844 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (allowing
FERC to pursue waiver defense on remand). The waiver defense is analyzed infra in text
accompanying notes 174-94.
59. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981).
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its earliest decisions on the filed rate doctrine as applied under the Interstate
Commerce Act (ICA), the Supreme Court instructed a rail carrier that it
must "abide absolutely by the [filed] tariff ... [and] so long as it [is] of force
.... In this respect, [the tariff is] to be treated as though it [were] a statute,
binding as such upon [r]ailroad and shipper alike." 60
This definition of the filed rate doctrine underscores the statutory primacy
of the regulator's primary jurisdiction to police just and reasonable utility
rates under applicable enabling legislation.
[T]he filed rate doctrine... assure[s] effective.., oversight of the rates
at which power [or any other regulated service] is sold. "The considerations underlying the [filed rate] doctrine . . . are preservation of the
agency's primaryjurisdiction over reasonableness of rates and the need
to insure that regulated companies'6charge only those rates of which the
agency has been made cognizant." '
The statutory basis of the filed rate doctrine is twofold. First, pipelines,
electric utilities, and other carriers must publicly file their rates. 62 Second,
they must thereafter charge only final filed rates that the regulator has determined to be just and reasonable. 63 The doctrine is applied most prominently
64
in ratemaking under either the Federal Power Act [FPA] or the NGA.
Sections 4(c) and 4(d) of the [NGA] require sellers of natural gas in
interstate commerce to file their rates with the Commission. Under
§ 4(a) of the Act,... rates.., for sale and transportation of natural gas
are lawful only if they are "just and reasonable." No court may substitute its own judgment ... for the judgment of the Commission. The
authority to decide whether the rates are reasonable is vested by § 4 of
the Act solely in the Commission, see FPCv. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591, 611 (1944), and "the right to a reasonable rate is the right to
the rate which the Commission files or fixes," Montana-Dakota Utilities
Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951). Except when the Commission permits a waiver, no regulated seller of natural gas may
collect a rate other than the one filed with the
65
Commission.
Statutory parallels govern not only the largely identical federal regulation
68
67
of electric utilities under the FPA, 66 but also railroads, motor carriers,
60. Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 197 (1913); see
Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 181 F.2d 19, 22 (8th Cir. 1950)
(rates filed and approved are lawful until changed in a way that is provided for by statute),
affid, 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
61. City of Girard, Kan. v. FERC, 790 F.2d 919, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added)

(citing City of Cleveland v. FPC, 525 F.2d 845, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
62. NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1982); FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1982).
63. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
64. Public Serv. Co. v. FERC, 600 F.2d 944, 957 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 90

(1979).
65. 453 U.S. at 576-77 (footnote omitted). The FERC also held that the filed rate doctrine and the rule against retroactive ratemaking limit the effective date of wellhead contract
rates under the NGPA. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 17 F.E.R.C.
61,232, at

61,453 (1981).
66. See, e.g., Southern Cal Edison Co. v. FERC, 805 F.2d 1068, 1070 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Electrical Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 774 F.2d 490, 492-93 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Anaheim v.
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and oil pipelines 69 under the Interstate Commerce Act. Courts have also
used the filed rate doctrine and the rule against
retroactive ratemaking to bar
71
retroactive telephone rates 70 and bus fares.
Under each of these statutory schemes the regulator alone possesses exclu72
sive jurisdiction to decide whether proposed rates are just and reasonable.
In turn, only just and reasonable rates are allowed to become final, filed
rates. 73 When a customer challenges existing final, filed rates, the regulator
decides the sufficiency of the challenge; 74 the regulator then has exclusive
jurisdiction to set new just and reasonable rates for the utility to file and
thereafter observe if the regulator deems the existing rates unlawful. 75 In
ElectricalDistrictNo. 1 v. FER C,76 the D.C. Circuit emphasized the overriding significance of the filed rate doctrine in the context of changing existing
rates that the regulator found no longer just and reasonable. The court confronted a claim that when a customer successfully challenged existing rates
and the regulator found the rates to be unjust and unreasonable, the regulator must immediately prescribe and implement lawful rates. Based on the
filed rate doctrine, the court rejected this contention and held that the old
rates remain in force, until the utilityfiles and the regulatoraccepts a compliFERC, 669 F.2d 799, 807-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Public Serv. Co., 600 F.2d at 957-58 (cases
apply filed rate doctrine and rule against retroactive ratemaking to electric utilities).
67. See Lowden v. Simond-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co., 306 U.S. 516, 520 (1939) ("Under
§ 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act the carrier cannot deviate from the rate specified in the
tariff") (citing Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 389 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 6(7) (1920)); Pennsylvania R.R., 230 U.S. at 197. Part I of the ICA, governing rail tariffs,
does permit retroactive refunds called reparations. See infra note 80.
68. See T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 468-71 (1959) (construing the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935).
69. See Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 642 (1978) (discussing § 15 of
ICA as augmented by Hepburn and Mann Elkins Act). As with all rates regulated under Part
I of the ICA, retroactive refunds, called reparations, may be available. See infra note 80.
70. Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
71. See Payne v. Washington Metro Area Transit Comm'n, 415 F.2d 901, 910-11 (D.C.

Cir. 1968).
72. E.g., Arkansas La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 452-53 (natural gas pipelines under NGA);
T.I.M.E., 359 U.S. at 475 (motor carriers under ICA); City of Cleveland v. FPC, 525 F.2d 845,
854 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (electric utilities under FPA).
73. In keeping with the rule against retroactive ratemaking, final rates are not subject to
refund. Final rates contrast with filed rates, which, pending a determination as to justness and
reasonableness, are allowed to go into effect expressly subject to refund. See, e.g., FPC v.
Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 23-25 (1968) (last final rate sets floor under NGA and cannot
be reduced via refunds); cf. Public Serv. Co., 6 F.E.R.C. 61,299, at 61,710 (1979) (addressing
analogous concept applied to formula rates or rate trackers on gas or fuel costs that go into
effect as a mathematical formula, without the regulator determining that any specific rate level
is just and reasonable).
74. This jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of a rate under NGA § 4 and FPA § 204
is exclusive. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 577 (NGA); Montana-Dakota, 341 U.S. at 250
(FPA). Jurisdiction to decide challenges to existing rates is primary, but not exclusive.
75. See, e.g., Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) (no
court may substitute its judgment as to what rate is reasonable (quoting FPC v. Southern Cal.
Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1964))); ArkansasLa. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 578 (FERC shall
determine just and reasonable rate to be observed); Montana-Dakota, 341 U.S. at 251-52
("right to a reasonable rate is the right to the rate which the Commission files or fixes").
76. 774 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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ance tariff setting forth the new rates. 77
2. Efficiency and Fairness through Rate Certainty and Rate Design
The next step in understanding how the courts have defined the rule
against retroactive ratemaking is to determine why the rule is essential to the
enforcement of the filed rate doctrine and to the regulator's primary jurisdiction to fix final rates. Three interrelated prohibitions within the rule against
retroactive ratemaking enforce the filed rate doctrine. The first two focus on
rate certainty. Court and agency decisions have affirmed, on the one hand,
the regulated utilities' right to rely on, and collect, filed rates without threat
of refund, so long as the utilities actually charge the filed rate. 78 On the
other hand, court and agency decisions have protected purchasers of utility
services by forbidding surcharges after the purchasers made their purchase
decisions based on filed rates that, for whatever reason, later prove to have
been too low.
Both lines of cases bar retroactive ratemaking, 79 although courts sometimes refer to the prohibition against requiring utilities to make refunds below filed rates as a bar on reparations. 80 The cases enforce the regulated
77. Id. at 494. The result in Electric Dist. No. I should be distinguished from cases in

which the courts lowered rates pursuant to NGA § 5 or FPA § 206 as of the date they were
determined to be unlawful and should have been changed absent "legal error" by the regulator
in failing to impose a timely remedy. E.g., Office of Consumers' Counsel, Ohio v. FERC, 826
F.2d 1136, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("when [regulator] has committed legal error in a section 5
case the proper remedy is one that puts the parties in the position they would have been in had
the error not been made"); Tennessee Valley Mun. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 470 F.2d 446, 452-53
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (implementing § 5 rate reduction to cure regulator's legal error, with remedy
extending back 112 days to date when regulator erroneously dismissed complaint). Absent a
finding of legal error by the regulator, however, NGA § 5 and FPA § 206 remedies do not
include retroactive refunds. See, e.g, Sea Robin Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 795 F.2d 182, 184, 189
n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (cases cited therein).
78. See, e.g., FPC v. Tennessee Gas Trans. Corp., 371 U.S. 145, 153 (1962) ("The [utility]
having initially filed [its] rates... must, under the theory of the [NGA], shoulder the hazards
incident to its action including not only the refund of any illegal gain but also its losses where
its filed rate is found to be inadequate."); FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 353
(1956) (if utility's filed or contract rate proves too low it can be remedied prospectively only).
79. See Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 258
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting on other grounds). Justice Frankfurter clearly summarized
the working of the filed rate doctrine as enforced by the rule against retroactive ratemaking:
"Despite the unqualified statutory declaration that unreasonable rates are unlawful, we think it
clear that Congress did not intend either court or Commission to have the power to award
reparations on the ground that a properly filed rate or charge has in fact been unreasonably
high or low." Id. (emphasis added); accord Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co.,
306 U.S. 516, 50-21 (1939).
80. See, e.g., Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 578 n.8 (1981) (FPC "may not
impose a retroactive rate alteration and, in particular, may not order reparations" (emphasis in
original)); FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 24 (1968); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591, 618 (1944) ("under the [NGA] the [FPC] has no power to make reparation
orders"). In Public Serv. Co. v. FERC, 600 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court suggested
that the rule against reparations is even stronger under the FPA than under the NGA. Id. at
957 n.51; cf. Middle S. Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 747 F.2d 763, 776 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing right to reparations under
ICA regulation of oil pipelines from absence of reparation authority under FPA), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 930 (1985); see also Alabama Power Co. v. ICC, No. 86-1052, slip op. at 2025 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 2, 1988) (affirming ICC's partial denial of retroactive refunds or ground of
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seller's and the purchaser's expectations of, and their reliance on, the known
status quo. 8 ' In this respect, there are several parallels to the filed rate doctrine in commercial transactions, in which the law seeks primarily to satisfy
82
the reasonable price expectations of the parties to an agreement.
The right to expect and rely on the filed rate is often discussed in terms of
advance notice. Indeed, the raison d'&re of the rule against retroactive
ratemaking and its parent, the filed rate doctrine, is to provide advance notice of a transaction's economics. Section 4 of the NGA and section 5 of the
FPA require that the regulated company publicly file rates and charges and
not change the rates and charges thereafter without "notice

. .

.given by

filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new
schedules stating plainly the change or changes .... 83 The Columbia court
emphasized that notice, in order to have any meaning, must permit those
who receive it to respond rationally by reducing their purchases from suppliers with the highest prices. 84 In order to support the direct bill that the
court struck in Columbia, the utility should have given direct notice to the
customers through filed tariff provisions informing the customers of the type
85
and amount of the charge to be added later.
The third prohibitory aspect of the rule against retroactive ratemaking
focuses on the role of the regulator. Cases in this group address the ability of
the regulator to police statutory rate requirements and implement regulatory
policy by designing rates that stimulate, retard, or maintain levels of supply
shippers' notice and reliance); T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1959)

(distinguishing motor carrier regulation under Part II of the ICA (Motor Carrier Act), which
does not permit reparations, from Part I (rail and oil pipeline) and Part III (water carriers),

which do permit limited common law right to reparation); Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 390 (1932) (limiting ICC discretionary authority to order retroactive refunds); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 197 (1913)
(recognizing limited right to award reparations on application of a rail shipper under the differ-

ent statutory scheme of original ICA).
81. Electrical Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 774 F.2d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (wholesale purchasers who must set resale rates need to know cost of what they are receiving before they can

set resale rates). The need of downstream distribution companies to rely on an electric utility's
filed rate is an "equitable factor" underlying the rule against retroactive ratemaking. Indiana
& Mich. Elec. Co., 502 F.2d at 344.
82. For example, in the law of contracts, courts prefer damages measurable in terms of a
contractually prescribed price term to extracontractual remedies such as restitution of benefits

conferred. See United States v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 498 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.
1974); 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1110, at 585-86 (1964) (At "common law ....
if the defendant alleged and proved the terms of the contract [or, by analogy, the tariff] ... the
amount for which the plaintiff got judgment was the contract price; he could not recover more
than that."); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.19 (1982); In modern commercial transactions a principal policy basis for avoiding a contract obligation is the doctrine of unconscionability, which implements a policy of preventing oppression and unfair surprise. See U.C.C.

§ 2-302 comment 1 (1982). Parties cannot ordinarily circumvent price terms under the doctrine, however, since "rarely can a party [to a commercial transaction] claim surprise as to
price." E. FARNSWORTH, supra, § 4.28, at 311; see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture

Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (courts can find nonprice terms unconscionable).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1982) (NGA); 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1982) (FPA).
84. 831 F.2d at 1141; accord Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 37, at 61,732 (Stalon,
Comm'r, alternative policy statement) ("No market can be expected to function efficiently if
prices in the market are not known to the contracting parties").

85. See id. (notice may not be imputed).
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and consumption of a regulated service. Under almost all rate regulatory
statutes the statute directs the regulator to prevent undue discrimination in
rates charged to similarly situated customers. 86 By imposing the filed rate
doctrine, the regulator can insure against unduly discriminatory deviations
from the filed rate by, for example, granting selective rebates, which are a
87
form of retroactive rates.
The regulator further implements policies, in significant part, through its
consistent enforcement of the filed rate design. Rate design for wholesale
service ordinarily classifies utility or carrier billings between fixed and variable charges. The regulator then designs rates for customers or customer
classes by determining the percentages or types of fixed and variable costs
that the utility or carrier recovers in its demand charge and commodity
charge.8 8 The regulators can realize the objectives of specific design formulas 89 only if both the seller and the purchaser know and can rely on a specific
design when they decide to sell or buy. Objectives traditionally pursued via
rate design include (1) equitable allocation of costs between customers and
customer classes, recognizing that the demand profile of each imposes different costs on the utility or carrier; (2) proper allocation of risk through open
communication of price signals; (3) allocational efficiency to discourage
wasteful uses of the regulated products and services; and (4) marketing
flexibility. 90
Seminal to achieving rate-design objectives is "stability or continuity of
rate structures ... in order that price and market signals can be communicated and then acted upon .... 91 Regulatory orders that retroactively
86. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c(b), 717d(a) (1982) (NGA); 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(b), 824e(a)
(1982) (FPA); 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1982) (motor vehicles under ICA); 49 U.S.C.. § 905(c)
(1982) (water carriers under ICA); 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1982) (communications carriers under
Federal Communications Act); see also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 549 F.2d
1186 (8th Cir.) (rail carriers under ICA), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
87. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1913) (affirming award of damages to shipper denied rebates that regulator had selectively granted to
shipper's competitors in violation of filed rate under ICA).
88. See Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 782 F.2d 730, 734-35 (7th Cir. 1986);
Columbia Gas Trans. Corp. v. FERC, 628 F.2d 578, 582-83 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (defining
demand and commodity components); Pierce, Natural Gas Rate Design: A Neglected Issue, 31
VAND. L. REV. 1089, 1094 (1978).
89. Common examples of rate design formulas from the regulation of natural gas pipelines are: (1) the fixed-variable formula, under which the pipeline recovers fixed costs in the
demand charge and variable costs in the commodity charge; (2) the modified fixed-variable
formula (currently used for most natural gas pipelines), which deviates from fixed-variable by
assigning equity return and taxes to the commodity charge; (3) the Seaboard formula under
which the regulator assigns 50% of nonproduction variable costs to the demand charge, In re
Atlantic Seaboard Corp., 11 F.P.C. 43 (1952), aff'd sub nom. State Corp. Comm'n v. FPC, 206
F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 922 (1954); and (4) the United formula used
during the gas deliverability shortages of the 1970s under which 25% of nonproduction variable costs are assigned to the demand charge. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 50 F.P.C. 1348
(1973), afl'd sub nor. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir.
1975); see Texas E. Trans. Corp., 30 F.E.R.C. 61,144, at 61,260-62 (1985).
90. Texas E. Trans. Corp., 2 F.E.R.C. at 61,259; see also Northern Ind.Pub. Serv. Co., 782
F.2d at 734 n.8 (rate design supposed to maximize system utilization, assure stable revenue
flow, transmit current market signals, assess consistent rates, and motivate pipelines to use
long-term planning).
91. Texas E. Trans. Corp., 30 F.E.R.C. at 61,259.
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burden past purchase decisions with costs that were not contained in the
tariff on file when the purchase decisions were made destroy stability and
continuity. Simply stated, "[o]nly current customers are now in a position to
'92
modify their purchasing decisions."
C. Redefining the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking
as an Accounting Rule
The direct bill stricken in Columbia and the take-or-pay direct bill in Order No. 500 squarely contravene rate certainty and notice and would undermine the regulator's flexibility to police and pursue regulatory policy
through rate design. In both instances, during the period upon which the
billing schemes are based no filed tariffs contained or gave notice of the subject direct bills. Undaunted, the FERC jettisoned the substantive objectives
of the filed rate doctrine and rule against retroactive ratemaking and, in their
stead, imposed a formalistic accounting rule that would allow the supplier to
bill customers for any expense characterized as current, based upon their
past purchases of the regulated services.
1. The FERC's New Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking
In response to the D.C. Circuit's concerns about the FERC's open-access
transportation initiatives in the Order No. 436 rulemaking, specifically the
court's concern regarding the FERC's failure to recognize and address growing pipeline take-or-pay liability in connection with the imposition of openaccess transmission, 93 the FERC promulgated in Order No. 500 a statement
of policy authorizing deficiency-based direct billing of pipeline payments to
gas producers to settle potentially billions of dollars in take-or-pay liabilities. 94 The FERC presented this direct bill as a rate recovery alternative to
the FERC's traditional and "current policy ...that take-or-pay [settlement]
costs are expenses related to the acquisition of gas supplies and should therefore be classified as production related and recovered through the pipeline's
[variable] commodity rates." 95
The new take-or-pay recovery mechanism would permit pipelines to continue to bill take-or-pay payments as a portion of the charge for gas currently sold in their variable commodity charge. Alternatively,
[P]ipelines that transport [as open-access transporters] under this rule
and volunteer to assume an equitable share of their take-or-pay costs
may request alternative rate treatment for the remaining costs. Under
92. Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co., 37 F.E.R.C.

61,310, at 61,912 (1986) (emphasis added).

93. Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

94. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,338, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,779.
95. Id., 52 Fed. Reg. 30,342, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at
30,786; accord Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 43 F.E.R.C. 61,329, at 61,928 (1988) ("commod-

ity recovery is the principal method approved by the Commission for the recovery of [take-orpay] costs"); Transwestern Pipeline Co., 40 F.E.R.C.

61,134, at 61,994 (1987) (affirming that

"current policy" of commodity classification provides "a reasonable opportunity to recover...
61,032, at 61,074
prudently incurred costs"); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 36 F.E.R.C.
(1986) (commodity classification is "traditional" practice).
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this provision, pipelines may elect to absorb from 25 to 50 percent of
their take-or-pay costs and may apply to recover an equal share of costs
through a fixed charge .... [with the] remaining amounts [to be] billed
through a commodity surcharge or volumetric surcharge on total pipeline throughput....
... [E]ach customer's demand surcharge should be based on [that
purchaser's] cumulative deficiency ofpurchases in recentyears measured
in relation to that customer's purchasesduring a 9representative
base pe6
riod prior to the accrual of take-or-pay liabilities.
What this means can be illustrated by some of the specific proposals that
the FERC has approved under Order No. 500. The FERC approved a proposal by Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company to bill its customers $650 million
in 1988 and 1989 based on how much less each customer purchased in 1983
to 1986 than in 1981-1982. 97 More recently the FERC allowed an Order
No. 500 take-or-pay direct bill tariff filed by United Gas Pipe Line Company
to take immediate effect without suspension and before hearing. 98 Under the
United Gas Pipe Line Company direct bill, the pipeline's customers immediately start to pay the pipeline up to nearly $250 million, allocated among the
customers in proportion to how much less gas they purchased in 1983-1986
than in 1980-1982. 99 In both cases, the pipelines will recover their take-orpay settlement costs even when those costs are offset by reductions in other
costs of providing utility service."00 Moreover, the Order No. 500 policy
requires that natural gas pipelines downstream of the direct billing pipeline
also bill their customers the upstream pipeline costs on the same retroactive
deficiency basis. 10'
96. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,341, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,784-85 (emphasis added).
97. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 43 F.E.R.C. at 61,931-32.
98. Allowing a major change, such as the Order No. 500 direct bill, to take effect without
suspension and before holding a hearing on contested issues was, in itself, a radical departure

from the FERC's general practice of not permitting automatically adjusted or tracked changes
in a single specific cost component of rates. The general practice, codified in 18 C.F.R.
§ 154.38(d)(3) (1988), requires that "any change.., be considered with other [cost] changes in

the context of a [NGA] section 4 rate case." Texas E. Gas Trans. Corp., 37 F.E.R.C.

61,260,

at 61,676 (1986); accord United Gas Pipeline Co., 20 F.E.R.C. 61,005, at 61,007 (1982)
(rejecting proposal to track transportation costs separately), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1507 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Sea Robin Gas Pipeline Co., 18 F.E.R.C. 61,277, at 61,575 (1982) (rejecting proposal

to track transportation costs separately).
99. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 42 F.E.R.C.

61,197, at 61,682-83 (1988).

100. See id. at 61,683; Tennessee Gas Pipe Line Co., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,175, at 61,629
(1988); cf supra note 98 (FERC regulations and precedent prohibit nearly all rate trackers of
single cost items).
101. See Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,345, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,791; see also Mississippi River Trans. Corp., 42 F.E.R.C.

61,244, at 61,788 (1988) (requiring downstream pipeline to implement upstream billing scheme
in accordance with Order No. 500); United Gas Pipe Line Co., 42 F.E.R.C. at 61,684. Most
states are beginning to approach the issue of downstream pass-through on a case-by-case basis.
See States Have Plans to Deal with Take-or-Pay Passed to Distributors, INSIDE F.E.R.C., Aug.

22, 1988, at 1.
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2. Mischaracterizingthe Result Under a Redefined Rule
In Order No. 500 the FERC defended billing schemes of this type against
charges of retroactive ratemaking.
The Commission rejects assertions that the cumulative deficiency
method of allocation based on historical sales data constitutes retroactive ratemaking. There is nothing in the Commission's proposal which
would retroactively change the rates pipelines have charged their customers in the past or which would involve imposing a rate increasefor
gas already sold. Rather, the proposed allocation method would enable
pipelines to recover in their future0 2rates costs which they have actually
incurred but have not recouped.'
In this response, the FERC both mischaracterizes the effect of its take-orpay direct bill and effectively redefines retroactive ratemaking.
As to the effect of the deficiency-based direct bill, Order No. 500 not only
permits, but requires a "rate increase for gas already sold."10 3 A purchaser's
current direct-bill liability for take-or-pay costs will either decrease or increase depending upon whether the purchaser bought more or less gas in a
recent period than in an earlier base period. It is not necessary that the
supplier file any tariff during either the recent or base period that would have
given notice of the direct bill to come. More importantly, the purchaser can
do nothing today to change its liability under the direct bill. In short, the
direct bill determines a customer's current liability entirely on the basis of
gas already sold or not sold.
That the deficiency-based direct bill changes the price for gas already sold
is apparent from the FERC's directives in Order No. 500 that specify periods over which the supplier will recover take-or-pay costs. For pipeline customers who continue to purchase the direct-billing pipeline's gas, the FERC
°4
The
contemplates a standard amortization period of four to five years.'
pipeline, however, is permitted to accelerate, through an exit fee, the total
deficiency-based take-or-pay obligation of customers who cease to purchase
services from the direct-billing pipeline.' 0 5 If the purchaser's liability for
take-or-pay costs were in any way a function of current or future purchases,
acceleration would plainly be illogical. If the take-or-pay costs were a function of current or future purchases, then there would be no charges to accel06
By
erate when the customer ceased current or future purchasing.'
allowing pipelines to accelerate the take-or-pay direct bill the FERC has
102. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,343, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,787 (emphasis added).
103. Id.
104. Id., 52 Fed. Reg. 30,345, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at
30,792.
105. United Gas Pipeline Co., 42 F.E.R.C. at 61,682-83.
106. Contra id. In response to an objection to United Gas Pipe Line's exit fee alleging
retroactive ratemaking, the FERC simply resorted to its irrelevant characterization of the accelerated charges as "current expenses." Id. at 61,683. Nowhere does the FERC explain how
"current" pipeline costs can be billed to noncurrent customers without resorting to retroactive
ratemaking.
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made it clear that an Order No. 500 direct bill is a charge for gas already
sold or not sold and is therefore wholly retroactive.
The FERC's defense also misconstrues the filed rate doctrine and rule
against retroactive ratemaking. Specifically, the FERC's statement that the
deficiency-based direct bill "would enable pipelines to recover in their future
rates costs which they have actually incurred but have not recouped"' 10 7 has
no bearing on the filed rate doctrine or the rule against retroactive ratemaking. The FERC has only stated a tautological proposition: A pipeline's obligation to pay when gas is not taken by a specific date is accompanied by a
make-up right permitting the pipeline to recoup prepaid gas up to five years
later; 10 8 it is thus necessarily true that the pipeline incurs liability but cannot
recoup its prepayment until later, if at all. When a cost is deemed accrued or
incurred is simply irrelevant to whether it is billed on an unlawful, retroactive basis.
The FERC's own accounting rules prescribe accrual, rather than cash,
accounting.'0 9 Under accrual accounting, the pipeline may have incurred an
obligation to take or pay either when it obligated itself to a gas supply contract, when it did not take the minimum contract quantity within the time
specified, or when the prepayment recoupment period expired. 10 Under
cash accounting, by contrast, the pipeline incurs its take-or-pay cost when
the pipeline actually pays the gas producer-seller. Each of these accounting
107. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,342-43, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,787.
108. Since 1967, the FERC's regulations have required contracts for transportation or sale
of natural gas to contain provisions that allow purchasers to make up prepaid take-or-pay
volumes at any time during the shorter of five years following the prepayment or the remaining
contract term. Non-Acceptability of Contracts between Independent Producers and Interstate
Natural Gas Companies Containing Certain Provisions in Daily-Contract-Quantity and Takeor-Pay-For Clauses, Order No. 334, 32 Fed. Reg. 865 (Jan. 25, 1967) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
§§ 154.103, 154.110 (1988)), reprinted in 37 F.P.C. 110 (1967). The purchaser's right to make
up is available in the future period, however, only to the extent that its purchases exceed the
minimum contract quantities, below which take-or-pay liability is incurred. Consequently, a
purchaser has little or no opportunity to exercise its make-up rights and recoup prepaid
volumes in a depressed sales market. By a recent notice of proposed rulemaking, the FERC
has proposed to eliminate the five-year make-up period entirely. Five-Year Take-or-Pay
Make-up Provisions in Natural Gas Producer-Pipeline Contracts, 53 Fed. Reg. 27,704 (July
22, 1988) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 154), reprinted in [Regs. Preambles 1988] F.E.R.C.
Proposed Regs. 32,464. For some unarticulated reason, the FERC's proposed rulemaking
asserts that take-or-pay settlements will be promoted by depriving pipelines and their customers of this remaining bargaining chip in their negotiations with gas producers. Id., 53 Fed.
Reg. 27,704, [1988] FERC Proposed Regs. at 32,283-84. If approved, this change will further
exacerbate the unequal bargaining strengths of the segments of the gas industry that have
resulted from the FERC's piecemeal deregulation.
109. Uniform System of Accounts Prescribed for Natural Gas Companies Subject to the
Provisions of the Natural Gas Act, Order No. 219, 25 Fed. Reg. 5616 (June 21, 1960) (codified at 18 C.F.R. 201 general instruction 11 (1988)); Uniform System of Accounts for Public
Utilities and Licensees Subject to the Provisions of the Federal Power Act, Order No. 218, 25
Fed. Reg. 5014 (June 7, 1960) (codified at 18 C.F.R. 101 general instruction 11 (1988)); Uniform System of Accounts Prescribed for Oil Pipeline Companies Subject to Provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act, Order No. 119, 46 Fed. Reg. 9044 (Jan. 28, 1981) (codified at 18
C.F.R. 352 general instruction 1-4 (1988)).
110. Accrual accounting attempts to record the financial effects on an entity of
transactions and other events and circumstances that have cash consequences
for the entity in the periods in which those transactions, events, and circum-
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perspectives, however, is irrelevant to the application and purposes of the
filed rate doctrine and rule against retroactive ratemaking. Whether a gas
pipeline recognizes its take-or-pay liability for ratemaking purposes pursuant
to accrual or cash accounting does not determine whether the pipeline's recovery of that liability in rates is permissible or unlawfully retroactive.
What is forbidden, and what the FERC did in Columbia and Order No. 500,
is to design a rate to recover accrued or actually paid costs based on past
purchase decisions that the customers made under final filed tariffs that did
not, at the time the customers made the purchase decisions, contain or
otherwise give advance notice of the later charge.",1
3.

Abandoning Purposes of the Filed Rate Doctrine and Rule Against
Retroactive Ratemaking

As a simple accounting requirement, the FERC's redefined rule against
retroactive ratemaking undermines the traditional purposes of the filed rate
doctrine and rule against retroactive ratemaking: rate certainty, notice, and
the ability of regulators to police regulatory requirements and enforce regulatory policies by influencing sale and purchase decisions. This is particularly true when the costs subject to a direct bill were classified as variable for
rate design purposes during the past period used to assign cost responsibility
retroactively. In Columbia and Order No. 500 the subject costs, gas production and commodity-classified gas supply costs, respectively, were variable
charges. In the context of take-or-pay costs, Order No. 500 took variable
costs classified to commodity charges 1 2 of gas pipelines' rates and made
them de facto fixed, unavoidable charges. As a result, a purchaser who rationally minimized variable costs by maximizing its purchases from gas pipeline sellers that offered the lowest variable costs realizes only later that its
strategy did not produce the lowest unit costs among the available alternatives when it made its purchasing decisions.
The FERC's Order No. 500 actually most burdens those pipeline customers that followed the FERC's advice to purchase least-cost gas from tradistances occur rather than only in the periods in which cash is received or paid by
the entity ....
Thus, accrual accounting is based not only on cash transactions but also on
credit transactions, barter exchanges, nonreciprocal transfers of goods or services, changes in prices, changes in form of assets or liabilities, and other transactions . . that have cash consequences for an entity but involve no concurrent

cash movement.
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
139-40 (1985).
CONCEPTS No. 6, ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

111. Rejecting challenges to the Order No. 500 direct bill, the FERC has argued: "If pipeline recovery of take-or-pay costs at the time they are paid were retroactive ratemaking merely
because the costs relate back to some past event, a pipeline could never lawfully recover these
costs under any rate treatment." Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,175, at 61,630
(1988) (emphasis in original). This argument is an obvious strawman; Order No. 500 is not
even under fire for allowing recovery of costs that "relate back to some past event," but rather
because it would bill customers, without advance notice, on the basis of past events.
112. See Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,342, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,786 (affirming that commodity classification was current and
longstanding practice before Order No. 500); see also supra note 95.
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tional or nontraditional suppliers.' 13 Assume, for example, that Purchaser14
(P)traditionally purchased from Seller One (S-1) during a "base" period'
all of its 100 gas units of demand at a variable commodity charge of $1.00
per unit. During a later period-the "recent" period in Order No. 500's
parlance 15-P reduced its S-1 purchases to 50 gas units in order to purchase
the balance of 50 gas units at the lower price of $.80 per unit from Seller
Two (S-2). P thereby reduces its variable cost by $. 10 per unit. For simplicity, further assume that P was the only purchaser to reduce its purchases
from S-1 between the "base" and the "recent" periods. 116 Under Order No.
500, the FERC authorized S-1 to change, retroactively, the effect of P's decision into a loss simply by proving that S-1 paid, or will pay, $21.00 to settle
its take-or-pay obligations. Under Order No. 500 S-1 can bill $10.50117 of
the $21.00 directly to P as a fixed charge. After the direct bill, P's economically rational purchase decision saved $10.00 in variable costs but added
$10.50 in an unforeseen and unavoidable fixed charge.
If P had possessed all of this price information, P would never have reduced its purchases from S-1 in the first place. Under Order No. 500, and
all other retroactive rates, however, the purchaser does not have full price
knowledge when the purchaser makes the decision to buy or not buy. Only
after P makes the economic decision to purchase from S-2 does P learn that
its economically rational choice produced irrational results.
Variations on this example are numerous. P may have reduced its
purchases from S-1 after determining that an investment in conservation
would produce savings in relation to continued purchases of regulated service from S-1 at the existing filed tariff rate. Alternatively, P may have made
a long-term investment in fuel-switching capability, which would be amortized in part by the lower variable cost of the alternative fuel over several
years. In each variation Order No. 500's use of past purchasing decisions to
impose later extra-tariff fixed charges alters the economics of these decisions
after the fact.
The purchaser is not the only loser. Competition in general loses since the
retroactive charge lessens the cost to S-1 of fewer or smaller sales, which
results in S-1 being shielded, in part, from the competitive pricing pressure
exerted by S-2. 1 8 Moreover, once utility or carrier purchasers come to ex113. The FERC has not disputed the fact that pipeline customers who most effectively used
the purchasing flexibility created by Orders No. 380 and No. 436 are hit hardest by Order No.
500's direct bill; rather, the FERC has simply opined that the beneficiaries of the FERC's
deregulatory initiatives should retroactively share in the "transition costs." Order No. 500,
supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,343, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at
30,787; see also supra note 57.
114. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
115. Id.
116. While there are many customers and customer classes on most pipelines, this assumption merely focuses the impact of Order No. 500's direct bill, but does not unrealistically dis-

tort how it affects customers.
117. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

118. In this respect, Order No. 500 guarantees a certain level of recovery of costs associated with gas sales service, similar to minimum commodity bills before they were stricken by
Order No. 380 and its progeny. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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pect that current purchase decisions may later result in unquantifiable retroactive liabilities, they too may become less price sensitive. In turn, reduced
price sensitivity would harm those, like S-2, who would otherwise compete
with S-1 for gas sales. In sum, retroactive ratemaking undermines the potential for gas sales competition that Orders No. 380 and No. 436 created.
Further, the traditional regulatory objectives of rate design become less
effective when the authorities permit, and market participants begin to expect, retroactive rates. As noted above, rates ordinarily are not a simple onepart charge from services rendered, but are designed to contain fixed and
variable charges. 19 Regulators change rate designs prospectively from time
to time to promote different regulatory objectives. For example, when the
supply of the regulated service is abundant, regulators often respond by
shifting fixed utility costs from the variable commodity charge to the demand charge to reduce avoidable costs and thereby induce higher levels of
consumption. 120 Conversely, during the shortages of deliverable gas in the
mid-1970s, the FERC's predecessor shifted costs from the demand charge to
the commodity charge in an effort to increase avoidable cost and thereby
induce conservation.12' In order for these and other regulatory strategies to
remain viable, the market participants must not perceive rate design as a
moving target.
III.

REWRITING THE FAILURES OF PIECEMEAL REGULATION WITH
RETROACTIVE RATES

Since the FERC's novel accounting interpretation of the rule against retroactive ratemaking undermines the traditional goals of the filed rate doctrine and rule against retroactive ratemaking, why has the FERC so
tenaciously embraced retroactive direct bills in both Columbia and Order
No. 500? The ostensible need for direct billing in Columbia resulted from a
three-year delay in promulgating rules needed to implement a key pricing
provision of the NGPA. Direct billing was chosen purportedly as a means
of putting all parties in the same position they would have been in absent the
delay.
The perceived need for a direct bill in Order No. 500 was to respond to a
court order vacating and remanding the FERC's Order No. 436 and, at the
same time, prod gas pipelines to become "open-access" transporters, rather
than simple contract carriers, 122 under the terms of that Order. 123 Less
clear in Order No. 500 than in Columbia is why the FERC selected direct
billing rather than some less objectionable form of rule recovery. The
FERC's explanations of its reasoning in Order No. 500 have been
119. See supra note 89.
120. See Texas E. Trans. Corp., 30 F.E.R.C. 61,144, at 61,260-61 (1985); supra note 89.
121. See Texas E. Trans. Corp., 30 F.E.R.C. at 61,260-61.
122. See supra note 28.
123. The take-or-pay relief provided by Order No. 500's retroactive direct bill is available
only to pipelines that become "open-access" transporters under Order No. 436. See supra note
37.
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The Columbia Direct Bill of Production-RelatedCosts

The direct bill stricken in Columbia grew out of section 110 of the
NGPA, 12 5 which permits natural gas producers to charge for certain costs
related to gas production 26 in excess of the otherwise applicable maximum
lawful price (MLP) in a first sale. 127 Not until 1980 in Order No. 94128 did
the FERC adopt regulations for quantifying and allowing gas producers to
bill these production-related costs. The FERC excluded the cost incurred by
producer-sellers for compressing gas from the 1980 regulations because it
presented "the single most complex cost category" and therefore required
further consideration.129 The FERC nevertheless assured producers and put
the pipelines on notice in 1980 that "a retroactive collection procedure
13
[would] be provided" once the necessary regulations were promulgated. 1
Those regulations were not adopted until March 7, 1983, in Orders No. 94A and No. 94-B.13 ' After the Fifth Circuit upheld those orders on appeal,132 producers began to bill purchasing pipelines for previous compression costs that the producers had incurred between July 1980 and March
1983.133
When the purchasing pipelines began to pass the retroactive charges
134
downstream to their resale purchasers, the FERC approved the charges.
Specifically, the FERC found that continuing the retroactive charge downstream was fair and appropriate in that it enforced the NGPA as if there had
been no delay in promulgating the regulations for billing compression costs.
According to the FERC, the compression charge "match[ed] ...[compres124. See infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 3320 (1982).
126. See supra note 44.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 3320(a)(2). The NGPA introduced phased wellhead deregulation under
which the FERC set price ceilings, called maximum lawful prices (MLPs), for the first sales of
gas based on either vintage of the gas or the characteristics of its production (e.g., deep gas or
stripper-well gas). On all new and some old gas, the FERC has or will phase out MLPs and a
deregulated price will govern first sales. See generally Danden Petroleum, Inc. v. Northern
Natural Gas Co., 615 F. Supp. 1093, 1099-1100 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (explaining NGPA pricing
system). Section 110 allows producers to recover the costs of production in excess of the
applicable MLP, without violating § 504(a), 15 U.S.C. § 3414(a) (1982), which makes it unlawful to sell gas at a price exceeding the MLP.
128. Order Amending Interim Regulations Under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and
Establishing Policy Under the Natural Gas Act, Order No. 94, 45 Fed. Reg. 53,099 (Aug. 11,
1980) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 270, 271 (1987)), reprinted in [Regs. Preambles 1977-1981]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,178 [hereinafter Order No. 94], affd sub nom. Texas E. Trans.
Corp. v. FERC, 769 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1985).
129. See Columbia, 831 F.2d at 1138 (quoting Order No. 94, 45 Fed. Reg. at 53,107, [Regs.
Preambles 1977-1981] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 31,218).
130. Id.
131. Order No. 94-A, 48 Fed. Reg. 5,152 (Jan. 24, 1983), reprinted in [Regs. Preambles
1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,420; Order No. 94-B, 48 Fed. Reg. 5,190 (Jan. 24,
1983) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 270, 271 (1983), reprinted in [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,421.
132. See supra note 128.
133. Columbia, 831 F.2d at 1138-39.
134. See supra note 128.
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sion] costs with those who benefitted from the costs ... with precision by
allocating the cost liabilities based only on the amount of gas each customer
135
[actually] purchased during the retroactive period."'
The pipelines began to bill the compression charges downstream in proportion to their customers' gas purchase during the 1980 to 1983 period.
Downstream purchasers, led by Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation,
objected on the ground of retroactive ratemaking. The FERC rejected this
argument, contending that both the 1980 and 1983 orders in Orders No. 94
and No. 94-A had put all downstream purchasers on notice of the charge
that would later be assessed,' 36 and therefore, the downstream purchasers
knew of their future liability when they made purchase decisions in the 1980
to 1983 period.
A unanimous panel of the court disagreed, holding that the direct bill was
a retroactive rate increase in violation of the NGA. 137 In the court's opinion, the rule against retroactive ratemaking "might have been overridden by
adequate notice."' 138 Although the court did not define what type of notice
would have been adequate, the court concluded that the 1980 and 1983 orders were not adequate. "Because they were addressed exclusively to first
sales ... ,they cannot be deemed to have placed downstream purchasers on
those costs through a
notice that they in turn would be expected to absorb
39
1
system of surcharges collected after the fact."'

In its petition for rehearing, the FERC retreated substantially from its
former contention that Orders No. 94 and No. 94-A constituted adequate
downstream notice. The FERC simply argued that during the 1980 to 1983
period, "Columbia and other pipelines [could] be held to the knowledge that
...they were not paying the full cost of the gas volumes they.., purchased
from the pipelines [upstream].' 40 Repeating its earlier matching argument,
the FERC contended that intergenerational equity' 4' required a waiver in
order to match compression costs from 1980 to 1983 with the customers that
135. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 36 F.E.R.C.

61,032, at 61,075 (1986) (interpreting or-

der approving downstream application of Order No. 94 direct bill in Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corp., 32 F.E.R.C. 61,230, at 61,543-45 (1985)).
136. Columbia, 831 F.2d at 1140 (citing Brief for FERC at 14).
137. Id. at 1139-40.
138. Id. at 1140.
139. Id. (emphasis in original).

140. Petition of FERC for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing en Banc at 13, Columbia Gas Trans. Corp. v. FERC, 844 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (order denying rehearing).

141. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48. Matching and intergenerational equity are
simply different perspectives on the ratemaking principle that regulated rates to a utility cus-

tomer should recover only those costs incurred in connection with the services provided to that
customer. In other words, regulated rates should match cost responsibility with cost incurrence, not only as between different regulated services but also as to different or intergenerational time periods. Often these concepts are invoked to structure rate refunds that result
when the regulated entity charges a rate higher than the rate allowed or when the regulated
entity charged a nonfinal rate that becomes effective subject to refund. In connection with a
refund, " 'matching' or 'intergenerational equity' . . . [requires] that the benefits of revenues
received by a public utility should ... flow to those customers who have borne the financial
burdens of the [regulated] operations that produced the revenues, and vice versa." Northwest
Pipeline Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 33 F.E.R.C. 63,076, at 65,293 (1985) (emphasis added), affd, 35 F.E.R.C.
61,284 (1986). In both Columbia and Order No. 500, by
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purchased gas during that period. 14 2 The FERC also argued for the first
time that the court failed to recognize that the FERC has authority under
section 4 of the NGA to waive the filed rate doctrine. 143
The court reaffirmed its earlier finding of impermissible retroactive
ratemaking, but instructed that, on remand, the FERC could try to develop
a justification based on the new waiver argument. Specifically, "the magnitude of the costs at issue" persuaded the court that it should not foreclose
the FERC from considering the waiver issue in a manner consistent with the
court's previous holding that the retroactive direct bill could not be re144
deemed by the allegation of adequate notice.
B.

The Take-or-Pay Direct Bill of Order No. 500

Order No. 500 articulated an interim rule and general statement of policy
in response to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Associated Gas Distributors v.
FERC.'45 In that case, the court upheld most elements of the FERC's Order No. 436, which the court characterized as a "complete restructuring of
the natural gas industry [that] may well come to rank [among] the ... great
regulatory milestones of the industry."'' 4 6 The court approved of Order No.
436's primary innovation, which required gas pipelines subject to the
47
FERC's jurisdiction to provide open-access to their transmission facilities
as a prerequisite to their participation in a new and streamlined regulatory
program, called blanket certificates, for the services they provide.148 To free
up pipeline capacity for open-access transmission, Order No. 436 also requires open-access pipelines to allow their firm sales service customers either
to convert, over a period of years, their entitlement to sales to a reservation
of transmission capacity or to back out of their sales entitlement altogether. 14 9 The court affirmed the conversion option, but reversed the outcontrast, the FERC invoked matching and intergenerational equity to increase, not decrease, a
regulated rate.
142. Petition of FERC for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 8, 12,
Columbia, 844 F.2d at 879.
143. Id. at 12.
144. Columbia, 844 F.2d at 880. The FERC later did so in Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 44
F.E.R.C. 61,183 at 61,573 (1988). For an analysis of the waiver granted in Panhandle, see
infra notes 181-94 and accompanying text.
145. 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
146. Id. at 993.
147. "Open access" is not common carriage in which all would-be shippers receive a pro
rata share of existing capacity. See Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 2, at 24-25.
"Open access" simply requires that transmission capacity be made available on a first-comefirst-served basis to the extent there is capacity available. Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at
996. An "open-access" natural gas can neither discriminate in favor of its sales customers nor
deny transmission capacity to shippers of third-party gas. The Associated Gas Distributors
court upheld Order No. 436's "open-access" requirement expressly because the FERC had
found that the pre-existing practice of favoring the pipeline sales customers was unduly discriminatory. Id. at 993, 998-1001. One commentator correctly observed that the FERC's
analysis "represents application ... of the 'essential facility' doctrine developed by the courts
under the Sherman Act .... " Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 2, at 24.
148. See 824 F.2d at 996 (describing blanket certification as "authorizing transportation
services generically and thus obviating the need for unwieldy individual certification"),
149. Id. at 1013-21.
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right reduction because it was unsupported by the record underlying Order
No. 436.150

Because the FERC lacks statutory authority to compel common carriage
by gas pipelines, '5 ' the FERC styled open-access transmission as a nonmandatory program to be selected or rejected by the pipelines.' 5 2 Experience
under Order No. 436, however, has proved that the choice is largely illusory.
Despite justified fears that open-access transportation would reduce sales
and exacerbate their take-or-pay exposure to gas producers,' 5 3 the pipelines
have, in fact, acquiesced to Order No. 436 because they otherwise would
potentially suffer even greater competitive injury if they were unable to compete for sales of transmission under Order No. 436.154
The Associated Gas Distributorscourt vacated and remanded Order No.

436 despite its approval of open-access because the order failed to address
concerns that the combined effect of open-access transportation for nonsales
customers and customer rights to convert contract demand for gas sales to
transportation capacity would exacerbate the already large take-or-pay liabilities that the pipelines owe gas producers.1 55 The court characterized the
FERC's arguments diminishing the magnitude of the take-or-pay problems
and its excuses for taking no remedial action as "utterly Panglossian.' 1 56
The FERC responded by issuing the general statement of policy authorizing
pipelines to bill directly take-or-pay costs via deficiency-based fixed charges.
150. Id. at 1018-20. The court found that the FERC's rulemaking record and findings
demonstrated a nationwide pattern of pipeline discrimination in refusing to transport gas in
competition with their own captive sales, which was effectively remedied by conversion. Id. at
996, 1017. By contrast, the reduction option permitted purchasers to go beyond regional markets to procure gas, in which event they would need to sever most, if not all, of their contractual demand for both sales and transportation of gas from the traditional pipeline. The court
found no evidence demonstrating that customers either needed or wanted that flexibility; nor
was the court convinced that affording customers complete rights to abrogate contracts was
necessary to remedy the evidence of preexisting discrimination against would-be transportation
customers. Id. at 1019-20. Absent such findings and a decision to remedy those findings under
§ 5 of the NGA, the court could not justify FERC's reduction option. Id.
151. See supra note 28.
152. Order No. 436, supra note 5, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,430, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 31,504;' see Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 996.
153. The Associated Gas Distributor'spanel questioned whether "open-access" was really
voluntary as structured, since "inability to provide blanket-certificate transportation for fuelswitchable users may in current market circumstance cause critical load loss" and spell bankruptcy for the non-"open-access" pipeline. 824 F.2d at 1024. The court aptly compared pipelines confronting Order No. 436's nonmandatory "open-access" option to a "condemned man
... given the choice between the noose and the firing squad." Id.; see also Griggs, supra note
31, at 97 (reviewing pipeline's initial reluctance); Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 2,
at 35-36 (explaining reasons for reluctance).
154. Most of the pipelines that initially asserted they would never become "open-access"
transporters, see INSIDE F.E.R.C., Nov. 4, 1985, at 4-5, have subsequently filed and accepted
open-access tariffs. Compare id. with Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, No. CP86-582;
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., No. CP86-585; Southern Natural Gas Pipeline Co., No. CP88316; Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., No. CP87-115; Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., No.
CP88-328; Trunkline Gas Co., No. CP86-586; United Gas Pipe Line Co., No. CP88-6.
155. 824 F.2d at 1044.
156. Id. at 1030.
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1. Pipeline Customers Received No Advance Notice of the Retroactive
Order No. 500 Direct Bill
In orders and opinions issued since the Columbia decision, the FERC has
taken pains to distinguish the rates found unlawfully retroactive in Columbia
from those permitted by Order No. 500's take-or-pay direct bill. In addition
to the current cost accounting defense, discussed earlier,' 57 the FERC has
argued that, even if the take-or-pay direct bill is retroactive in appearance,
the bill is redeemed by adequate notice provided to all direct-bill targets,
both direct and indirect downstream purchasers. In connection with the
Tennessee Gas Pipeline direct bill that the FERC recently approved, for example, the FERC pointed to its 1984 Order No. 380 as containing notice to
pipeline customers that their purchases in 1981 to 1982 and 1984 to 1986
would later be subject to the direct bill.1 5 8 This argument, perhaps more
than any other, illustrates the lengths to which the FERC will go to defend
Order No. 500's direct bill and, in turn, Order No. 436's open-access program. In fact, there was even less notice in Order No. 380 than in the two
orders involved in Columbia.
Order No. 380 grew out of a rulemaking finding that variable-cost minimum commodity bills contained in gas pipeline tariffs were unjust and unreasonable and needed to be eliminated.1 59 By eliminating variable-cost
minimum commodity bills, the FERC made pipeline customers responsible
for fewer fixed or sunk costs. 160 As a result, customers attained greater flexibility to purchase lower-cost gas from nontraditional suppliers,' 6' making it
more difficult for the traditional supplier to satisfy its take-or-pay commitments to gas producers at the wellhead.' 62 The FERC further exacerbated
the pipelines' potential take-or-pay exposure, when it rejected pipeline requests that the FERC assure some form of recovery for take-or-pay prepayments 63 outside the variable-cost commodity charge so that their recovery
would not be compromised by Order No. 380's elimination of the variable1 64
cost minimum commodity bill.
Responding to these pipeline complaints, the FERC provided its purported advance notice of the direct bill to come over four years later in Or157. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
158. 42 F.E.R.C. at 61,630.
159. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
160. Order No. 380, supra note 23, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,783-84, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,964-65; see also Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 2, at
23; Note, supra note 23, at 131-33.
161. See Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1114 (1986).
162. Despite this obvious interrelationship, the FERC rejected contentions that take-orpay relief should accompany elimination of variable (and later, fixed) cost minimum commod-

ity bills. Order No. 380, supra note 23, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,788, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,971; see Note, supra note 23, at 136, 146. The court upheld the
FERC on the ground that the FERC was acting within its reasonable discretion to deal with
take-or-pay separately in a later proceeding. 770 F.2d at 1160.
163. See supra note 108.

164. Order No. 380, supra note 23, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,787-88, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,970; Note, supra note 23, at 136.
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der No. 500. The specific passage of Order No. 380 cited by the FERC
reads:
Opponents of the rule argue that no customer should be forced to pay
part of those carrying costs to the extent that they were caused by another customer's cutbacks.
The Commission is somewhat sympathetic to this line of reasoning.
There may be some justificationfor requiringprepayment carrying costs
to be paid by certain customers if it can be demonstrated that their cutbacks caused the prepayments. No conclusion is reached on this point
today; the matter requiresfurther investigation. Accordingly, the Commission encourages its Staff to consider in individual rate cases whether
and under what circumstances take-or-pay
carrying costs should be al165
located separately from other costs.
This passage, written in May 1984, simply instructs the FERC's staff to
investigate in future, individual pipeline rate cases whether carrying costs of
take-or-pay prepayments should be allocated separately from other costs.
That directive surely fails to satisfy the actual notice standard that the Columbia court required to redeem what would otherwise constitute an unlawful retroactive rate. 166
2. Matching and IntergenerationalEquity Are Rarely Achieved by
Retroactive Rates
In both Columbia and Order No. 500, the FERC argued that retroactive
rates should be countenanced when they are necessary to insure that those
who benefit from utility service pay for the costs incurred by the utility to
provide that service. The FERC presents this argument as one of cost responsibility and intergenerational equity. 167 In Columbia, for example, the
FERC argued that the downstream purchasers of gas during the period 1980
to 1983, when the regulations for recovering production-related compression
costs were not yet in effect, should pay the costs of compressing that gas in
165. Order No. 380, supra note 23, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,787-88, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,971 (emphasis added).

166. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. Order No. 380's discussion'of prepayment carrying costs does not even address the same type of costs as are subject to the Order No.
500 direct bill. Order No. 500 covers take-or-pay settlement costs defined as nonrecoupable
payments to buy out of take-or-pay liability or to reform existing contracts. Proposed Policy
Statement, supra note 38, 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,728; see Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg.
30,342, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,784 (adopting Proposed
Policy Statement); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 43 F.E.R.C.
61,329, at 61,928 (1988) (ex-

cluding prepayments from Order No. 500 direct bill). By contrast, the carrying costs on takeor-pay prepayments discussed in Order No. 380 were expressly and totally excluded from the
fixed take-or-pay direct bill authorized in Order No. 500. Proposed 18 C.F.R. § 2.14(g)
("[tihis section does not ... affect take-or-pay prepayments"). Additionally, even if it were
construed as notice, Order No. 380 was issued in May 1984, more than three years after certain of the purchasing base periods used to compute take-or-pay liability under Order No. 500
direct bills. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99. Finally, conspicuously absent from
Order No. 380 is any notice as to even approximate amounts of future take-or-pay liability or
the basis of targeting customers based on past purchase levels. This information-vital to any
intelligent gas purchasing strategy-is nowhere revealed in Order No. 380.
167. See supra note 141.
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proportion to their actual 1980 through 1983 purchases. 168 If these customers do not pay the compression costs, the FERC correctly observed, a later
generation of ratepayers will be forced to pay for services they may not have
received. Based on this argument, the FERC sought to defend the Columbia
direct bill on the ground that it perfectly "match[ed] . .. costs with those
who benefitted from the costs" when they purchased gas during the same
periods. 169 While this argument has superficial appeal, its logic founders on
the rocks of application. Even perfect matching at one upstream level of a
transaction does not and, given the myriad transactions between wellhead
and end-use markets, cannot ensure that those who ultimately pay the retroactive charge downstream are the same end users that received utility service
in the past.
Suppose, for example, that the FERC allowed pipelines who paid producer/sellers for compression charges to bill those costs downstream to their
immediate purchasers in proportion to purchases during an earlier period.
Such an approach provides no assurance that the direct bill would reach
further downstream to the end use customers who actually received the gas
in the earlier period. Inequity would almost certainly result because local
distribution rates are ordinarily designed volumetrically; 170 without pervasive (and unlikely) change in local regulatory rules, local distribution customers would ultimately pay the upstream retroactive charges irrespective of
whether they had bought gas or even were customers during the earlier
period. 171
Even if local rate designs permitted retroactive fixed charges, the task of
segregating ultimate end users who were within the local rate jurisdiction
and actually purchased gas during the past period from those end users who
were not in the jurisdiction or did not purchase gas during that period would
168. 831 F.2d at 1138-39.

169. Tennessee Gas Pipe Line Co., 36 F.E.R.C.

61,032, at 61,075 (1986) (FERC inter-

preting Order No. 94 billing, before court's decision in Columbia, to support take-or-pay direct
bill); see supra notes 47-48, 141 and accompanying text.
170. Unlike the multiple-part rate designs, discussed supra note 89, a volumetric rate is a
one-part rate that recovers costs in a commodity charge per unit of service actually sold.
171. While most states are still deliberating on the issue of downstream billing, some have
already rejected downstream adherence to FERC's retroactive purchase-deficiency methodology. For example, the Virginia State Corporation Commission found that the FERC's Order
No. 500 "methodology would be impossible to administer given the diversity of respective
LDC customer populations." In re Consideration of Adoption of Policy for Recovery of Costs
Associated with Take-or-Pay Liability, No. PUE880028, slip op. at 14 (Va. St. Corp. Comm'n
Sept. 27, 1988). Accordingly, the Virginia Commission prescribed for recovery of take-or-pay
direct bills a fixed volumetric charge to all current and future firm sales and transportation
customers. Id., slip op. at 2. The Illinois Commerce Commission and the Indiana Utility
Regulatory Commission similarly rejected the FERC's Order No. 500 methodology on the
ground that all customers, and not merely customers that reduced past purchases, have
benefitted from deregulatory restructuring of gas markets. See In re Investigation into the
Appropriate Recovery by Illinois Gas Utilities of Costs Associated with Take-or-Pay Charges
from Interstate Pipeline Companies, No. 88-0103, slip op. at 12-14 (Ill. Corp. Comm'n Nov.
22, 1988); INSIDE F.E.R.C., Oct. 17, 1988, at 4. Like Virginia, the Illinois and Indiana Commissions prescribed a fixed volumetric charge on current and future firm sales and transportation. Id. For a general understanding of the political resistance to any generic change in the
design of locally regulated rates, see Pierce, supra note 88, at 1160-62 (proposing marginal
rather than imbedded cost pricing).
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be prohibitively expensive and very likely impossible. In a mobile society
end-use profiles for gas, electric, and other utilities constantly change as residential customers move or switch fuel sources and industrial and commercial users start new businesses, close others, or switch fuel sources.
Ratemakers have therefore traditionally had to reject superficially attractive
efforts to achieve intergenerational equity via retroactive rates.

72

As in Columbia, the FERC has periodically touted intergenerational
matching of costs and benefits as an equitable justification for the take-orpay direct bill in Order No. 500.173 This approach is surprising since the
Order No. 500 direct bill, unlike that in Columbia, would bill customers not
on the basis of identifiable past purchases, but on the basis of reductions in
their purchases between one period and a more recent period. That is, Order
No. 500 assigns cost responsibility on the basis of gas not purchased. The
FERC has repeatedly and consistently concluded that it is not possible to
match, even imperfectly, pipeline take-or-pay costs with downstream customer decisions not to purchase gas during past periods.1 74 Moreover, the
FERC has recognized that, in addition to customer purchasing patterns,
pipeline take-or-pay liabilities are the product of numerous unquantifiable
factors, including economic recession, fuel switching, conservation and excessive gas purchases by pipelines following the deliverability shortfalls and
resulting curtailments of the late 1970s and early 1980.175 In addition, the
courts have found that the FERC exacerbated take-or-pay liabilities by failing to address take-or-pay in 1983, when it began to dismantle traditional
pipeline sales markets in Order No. 380, and again in 1985, when it began to
176
convert the pipelines from gas merchants into "open-access" carriers.

172. For example, in Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co., 37 F.E.R.C.
61,310 (1986), a FERC
order, which was later reversed on appeal, prevented the pipeline from charging a higher price
for its gas sales during past periods. To recover the higher costs, the pipeline proposed a
retroactive direct bill on the ground that it would "assure proper assignment of cost responsibility." Id. at 61,911. The FERC rejected the direct bill and, in its answer, described how a
certain amount of cost shifting in regulated rates was inevitable. Id. at 61,912, 61,914 n.8.
Ironically, the FERC earlier recognized in Order No. 436 the likelihood of shifts in cost responsibility between classes and generations of ratepayers. The FERC characterized the expected cost shifts as the "pinch of competition" and opined that "[n]either the pipeline [n]or its
remaining customers should be immune from feeling the 'pinch of competition.'" Order No.
436, supra note 5, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,442, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs.
at 31,524.
173. See Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 38, 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,726-27. The Proposed Policy was the FERC's first articulation of the retroactive direct bill and formed the
basis for that portion of Order No. 500. See. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,350
[Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,798-99.
174. See Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 38, 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,727-28; supra note
57.
175. Transwestern Pipeline Co., 42 F.E.R.C.
61,306, at 61,919 (1988) ("certain fundamental market changes during the 1980's" caused the take-or-pay problem); Order No. 500,
supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,336, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at
30,777; Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 38, 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,725; see also Order No.
380, supra note 23, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,787, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs.
at 30,970 (finding no direct relation between pipeline take-or-pay liability and elimination of
variable-cost minimum bills, which created flexibility to reduce purchases from traditional
pipeline supplies).
176. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. FERC, 823 F.2d 639, 640-42 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Asso-
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Since even the superficial appeal of the intergenerational equity defense is
premised on a showing that retroactive rates match cost incurrence with past
benefits to identifiable past customers, the FERC's admitted inability to
match take-or-pay costs with past decisions not to purchase gas deprives the
FERC's equity defense in Order No. 500 of any persuasiveness whatsoever. 177 The FERC has nevertheless persisted, and has instructed downstream purchasers that it is not interested in receiving factual evidence that
shows that matching falls apart downstream.' 7 1
3.

The Filed Rate Doctrine Is Subject To Limited Waiver,
But Not Total Elimination

The FERC's most recent defense of the retroactive rate in Columbia is
179
that the agency enjoys a limited authority to waive the filed rate doctrine.
In its rehearing order, the Columbia court instructed that the FERC remained free to develop this waiver argument on remand, 80 and the FERC
did so in a recent decision waiving the filed rate doctrine to allow Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co. to bill compression costs on the same retroactive basis
that the Columbia court found violated the rule against retroactive ratemaking.' s ' The reappearance in Panhandle of the waiver defense, however, is
unlikely to save the billing in either Columbia and related cases or, by analciated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1022-24 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Order No. 500, supra
note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,336, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,777.
177. In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 36 F.E.R.C. 61,071 (1988) the FERC found that a
pre-Order No. 500 take-or-pay direct bill, partially based on past-purchase deficiencies, "either
ignore[d] or only partially incorporate[d] the matching principles that were key to the other
[retroactive] direct billing proposals [that] were approved by the Commission" and later reversed by the court in Columbia. Id. at 61,075. Later, the FERC modified Tennessee's proposal to incorporate Order No. 500's direct bill, which is completely based on past-purchase
deficiencies, and concluded that the modified version would successfully trace cost causation.
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 43 F.E.R.C. 61,329, at 61,929-33 (1988). Any factual support
for tracing, however, was conspicuously absent.
178. For example, in Mississippi River Trans. Corp. (MRT), 42 F.E.R.C. 61,244 (1988),
a downstream natural gas pipeline, MRT, requested that the FERC allow it to bill the take-orpay settlement costs billed to it from its upstream pipeline on a basis other than Order No.
500's retroactive direct bill. MRT argued that the past-purchase-deficiency billing mechanism
was not appropriate "because (1) [MRT] has ... maintain[ed] its sales load... ; and (2) there
is no nexus between [MRT's current] sales . . . and its reduced purchases of gas from [the
upstream pipeline]" during past periods. Id. at 61,788. Ignoring MRT's "nexus" argument,
the FERC ordered MRT to refile its tariff in accordance with Order No. 500. Id. The only
finding FERC made was that MRT had lost part of its sales markets during the period that
formed the basis of its upstream supplier's direct bill. Id. Further downstream at the local
distribution level, state regulatory commissions are in the preliminary stages of determining
how they will design local rates to respond to upstream take-or-pay direct bills. See supra note
171. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Chairman Shane characterized the state perspective as one of "watching the pig coming through the python." INSIDE F.E.R.C., May 25,
1988, at 1.
179. See supra notes 58, 143-44 and accompanying text.
180. 831 F.2d at 1142.
181. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 44 F.E.R.C. 61,173 at 61,573 (1988). Panhandle, like
Columbia, involved a pipeline's application to recover currently its NGPA § 110 compression
costs from an earlier period. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
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ogy, Order No. 500182 from findings of illegal retroactivity.
The FERC bases its assertion of waiver on parallel provisions of section
4(c) of the NGA and section 205(d) of the FPA. Sections 4(c) and 205(d)
prescribe that "no change shall be made by any natural-gas company in any
[filed] rates... except after thirty days' notice to the Commission and to the
public,"' 183 and that "no change shall be made by any public utility in any
[filed] rate[s] ... except after sixty days' notice to the Commission and to the
public,"' 184 respectively. Both statutes further provide that for good cause
the FERC may allow rate changes without the thirty or sixty days' notice. 18 5
The FERC further points to the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., which construes this statutory language. The Court instructed that while "the Commission may not impose a retroactive rate
alteration..

.,

it may 'for good cause shown'.

. .

waive the usual requirement

of timely filing of an alteration in a rate."' 186
The defect of the FERC's waiver argument lies in the FERC's own longstanding definition of good cause and in the duration of the waivers that
would be necessary to support the Columbia, Panhandleand Order No. 500
retroactive bills. The FERC has explained and the courts have found that
"[tlhe Commission's long-standing general policy is to find 'good cause' only
when the parties to the rate have agreed at some point in their negotiations
on [a different] effective date and the waiver is in the public interest."' 187
When the parties expressly agree and no party opposes an earlier effective
date, "[d]eference to the parties' contractual arrangements ... does not impair the regulatory powers of the [regulator]."'
By requiring an agreement
or consent, the good cause waiver, like the notice requirement of the filed
rate doctrine, 18 9 "promotes equity among the parties to a ratemaking proceeding by giving each party the same power to control the effective date of a
new rate."' 190
This good cause exception cannot apply in Columbia and related cases,
such as Panhandle,or in Order No. 500 because there were no expressions of
mutual agreement or consent before the purchase billing period in Columbia
182. The FERC has not yet raised the waiver defense in connection with the Order No. 500
direct bill presumably because Order No. 500 was issued before the first Columbia remand.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1982).
184. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1982).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(c) (1982) (NGA); 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1982) (FPA).
186. 453 U.S. at 578 n.8 (emphasis in original).
187. City of Girard, Kan. v. FERC, 790 F.2d 919, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added)
(citing City of Piqua, Ohio v. FERC, 610 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Pacific Power &
Light Co., 27 F.E.R.C.
61,080, at 61,148 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co., 20
F.E.R.C. 61,353, at 61,730-31 (1982); Dayton Power & Light Co., 12 F.E.R.C. 61,296, at
61,678-79 (1980)); see generally Note, FERC Waiver of the Filed Rate Doctrine: Some Sug-

gested Principles, 9 ENERGY L.J. 497 (1988) (reviewing waiver decisions and defining "good
cause" under NGA as function of notice, contractural intent, reliance equity and public policy

of NGA and NGPA).
188. City of Piqua, 610 F.2d at 954; see City of Girard, 790 F.2d at 925 ("requiring the
waiver to be in the public interest fulfills the Commission's statutory mandate to regulate ...
with a view to the public interest").
189. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
190. City of Girard, 790 F.2d at 925.
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and Panhandle or before the "base" or "deficiency" periods used to target
take-or-pay costs in Order No. 500. The Columbia, Panhandle and Order
No. 500 direct bills would have required hundreds of advance agreements
between interstate pipelines and their purchasers in order to satisfy the good
cause standard. Those agreements simply do not exist. Consequently, the
FERC cannot now declare the existence of waivers by simply abandoning its
own longstanding interpretation of good cause. 19 1 Yet, that is precisely
what the FERC did, without explanation, in Panhandle. In so doing, the
FERC simply reated its earlier contention, rejected by the Columbia court,
that intergenerational equity alone, without mutual intent, constituted good

cause to abandon both the filed rate doctrine and rule against retroactive
1 92

ratemaking.
In addition, even where evidence of mutual agreement has demonstrated
good cause, the FERC has ordinarily waived the statutory thirty- or sixtyday advance filing requirements for only relatively short periods, five or six
months at the greatest.' 93 By contrast, the waivers needed to redeem the
191. The FERC "bears the burden of explaining the reasonableness of any departure from
a long standing practice, and any facts underlying its explanation must be supported by substantial evidence." Public Serv. Comm'n v. FERC, 642 F.2d 1335, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(quoting Columbia Gas Trans. Corp. v. FERC, 628 F.2d 578, 586 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
Since FERC failed to argue waiver in Order No. 500, no reasoned explanation or evidence
exists that would warrant changing the FERC's longstanding interpretation of "good cause" in
connection with Order No. 500's retroactive direct bill. Even if the FERC asserts waiver in
future attempts to justify the retroactivity of Order No. 500's direct bill, the necessarily radical
redefinition of good cause is unlikely to satisfy the retroactivity doctrine, which limits retroactive applications of agency rules. See, e.g., Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. NLRB,
466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (interpreting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203
(1947)). As a statement of policy, Order No. 500's direct bill is probably confined to prospective application as a matter of law. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 38 ("A policy
statement announces the agency's tentative intentions for the future." (emphasis added)).
192. 44 F.E.R.C. at 61,573 ("Equity demands ... procedure which will allow Panhandle to
collect production related costs from those customers who caused their incurrence.").
193. See, e.g., Towns of Concord, Wellesley, Massachusetts v. FERC, 844 F.2d 891, 896
(1st Cir. 1988) (waiving 60-day requirement); City of Girard, 790 F.2d at 925 (waiving three of
60 days notice); City of Piqua, 610 F.2d at 951-52 (rate effective three months before tariff
filed); Pacific Power & Light Co., 27 F.E.R.C. at 61,146 (1982) (one month before tariff filed);
Connecticut Light & Power Co., 20 F.E.R.C. at 61,730-31 (1982) (25 days before tariff filed).
Only in Hall v. FERC, 691 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1985), did a
court grant a significantly longer waiver. After finding that an express agreement in a 1954
contract triggered an indefinite price escalator as of a date certain in 1961, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the FERC and found good cause to waive the filing requirement and permit billing
based on wellhead sales occurring up to 21 years earlier (1961 to 1972). Id. at 1187, 1195-96.
However, Hall is distinguishable from both Columbia and Order No. 500. Gas purchasers did
not agree in either Columbia or Order No. 500 to pay the gathering or take-or-pay costs retroactively from a certain date. See also Towns of Concord, Wellesley, 844 F.2d at 896 (emphasizing requirement of mutual agreement). Hall is also distinguishable on the face of the court's
reasoning. Integral to the court's analysis in Hall was that the waiver only permitted the
producer to bill the pipeline, while "[ilt [was] far from clear that [the pipeline] would be entitled to pass along to its customers an amount representing its delayed payment[s] for
purchased gas .... " 691 F.2d at 1193. In Columbia and Order No. 500, by contrast, the
pipeline would bill its customers if the waiver were granted. This distinction was key to the
Hall court's decision, which recognized that
[i]t is well settled that the Commission's duty under the NGA statutory scheme
...is "to afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges." The clear import... is that the underly-
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direct bills in Columbia, Panhandle, and Order No. 500 are vastly longer:
six years in Columbia, nine years in Panhandle, and up to seven years in
some of the FERC decisions implementing Order No. 500.194
IV.

EFFECTIVE TAKE-OR-PAY RELIEF THROUGH PROSPECTIVE
RATEMAKING AND REGULATION

It is ironic that the FERC ultimately looked to Order No. 380 as notice of
Order No. 500's retroactive direct bill and that it imposed the direct bill
order to salvage Order No. 436 on remand from the court. Orders No. 380
and No. 436 actually exacerbated the large take-or-pay liabilities that Order
No. 500 purports to solve with unlawful retroactive ratemaking.
The irony increases when it is recognized that in comments on the
rulemakings that produced Orders No. 380 and No. 436, various segments
of the industry and one FERC commissioner repeatedly urged the FERC to
taker prospective remedial action on take-or-pay in 1983 and 1985, respectively. 1 95 If the FERC had heeded those recommendations, it would have
alleviated the magnitude of the pipelines' current take-or-pay exposure. The
recommended actions included: (1) scrutinize how pipelines incurred their
take-or-pay liabilities to determine whether the pipelines acted imprudently,
and deny rate recovery to those liabilities found to be imprudent; 19 6 (2) limit
ing purpose of the NGA is protection of the consumer, "even though this may
result in some injustice to the producers"....
[I]t is [thus] far from clear
whether [the pipeline] could justify [a waiver permitting] its requested rate

increase.
Id. at 1193 (citations omitted) (quoting Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S.
378, 388 (1959)). In addition, the court found evidence that matching and intergenerational
equity would not be a significant problem, id. at 1193 ("little evidence in the record to suggest
that ... 1961-1972 customers are in fact different from its 1980 customers"), whereas customer
profiles since 1980-the period covered by the Order No. 500 direct bills-have changed dramatically, creating significant intergenerational and matching problems.
194. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text; Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 44 FERC at
61,572..
195. See Order No. 436, supra note 5, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,462-63, [Regs. Preambles 19821985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 31,560 (summarizing comments on 1985 rulemaking); Order
No. 380, supra note 23, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,787 [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. &
Regs. at 30,970-71 (summarizing comments on 1982 rulemaking). Concurring in Order No.
380, Commissioner Sousa wrote in 1983:
Competition in the natural gas industry is hampered by many factors; minimum
commodity bills are just one of those factors. Take-or-pay provisions are another. Therefore, although I agree with this rule, I believe that it addresses only
one part of the problem, and the Commission should promulgate a rule on takeor-pay provisions in producer-pipeline contracts. Indeed the Commission
should have done that concurrently with the issuance of this rule.
[1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,981 (Sousa, Comm'r, concurring). In his concurrence to Order No. 500, Commissioner Sousa again objected to the FERC's failure to act
directly against non-competitive take-or-pay provisions. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed.
Reg. 30,356-57, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,806.
196. When Tenneco, Inc. abruptly announced in 1988 that its pipe division, Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Co., recognized a $2 billion potential liability for take-or-pay, see Medina, McKenzie
& Daniels, supra note 4, at 186, and filed to recover its settlement costs, many of Tennessee's
customers challenged whether the liabilities had been prudently incurred. The FERC set the
issue for what proved to be a two-month hearing, but then refused to decide the issue of
prudence on appeal when Tennessee agreed to a billing mechanism similar to Order No. 500's.
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or otherwise allow pipelines to escape take-or-pay requirements by inserting
bilateral "economic out" provisions in gas supply contracts; (3) enjoin any
rate recovery of nonrecoupable take-or-pay obligations; (4) refunctionalize' 9 7 take-or-pay costs from exclusively production to both production and
transmission to minimize cost shifts and potential for intergenerational inequity; and (5) reclassify some or all take-or-pay settlement costs to the demand charge for billing based on current contract demand levels rather than
198
past purchase decisions.
Instead of pursuing these remedies to the take-or-pay problem, the FERC

adopted, in connection with Order No. 500's retroactive direct bill, new regulations that permit open-access pipelines to refuse to transport a particular
producer's gas if that producer declines to sign an affidavit in which the
producer offers to credit on a unit-per-unit basis the amount of gas transported against gas not taken and therefore subject to take-or-pay liability
under pre-June 1987 contracts.1 99 In its Associated Gas Distributorsremand,
the D.C. Circuit suggested a similar remedy that would simply permit openaccess transporters to deny access to producers who refused to renegotiate
2
take-or-pay contracts. 00
Instead, the FERC relied on Order No. 500's directive to deem presumptively prudent for
purposes of direct billing an amount of take-or-pay settlement costs equal to the amount (25 to
50%) absorbed by the pipeline. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,174, at 61,62627 (1988); accord Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,342-43, [Regs. Preambles 19861987] FE.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,787. This presumption that take-or-pay liabilities were
incurred prudently if the pipeline later absorbs some of the cost of settling the liability is a non
sequitur on its face. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 42 F.E.R.C. at 61,636 (Sousa, Comm'r,
concurring) ("50-50 sharing of take-or-pay costs is meaningless unless the Commission finds
that the underlying transaction between the pipeline and the producer is itself reasonable").
Nevertheless, the FERC threatens customers who insist on an opportunity to rebut the presumption at an evidentiary hearing with a retroactive direct bill of not merely their deficiencybased allocation of up to 50% of the pipeline's take-or-pay settlement costs, but of all costs
found prudent after hearing. E.g., Southern Natural Gas Co., 43 F.E.R.C. 61,186, at 61,47779 (1988); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 42 F.E.R.C. at 61,626; United Gas Pipe Line Co., 42
F.E.R.C.
61,197, at 61,681 (1988); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 42 F.E.R.C.
61,407, at 62,204 (1988). That threat is particularly potent since the FERC forces customers
to choose before they are given an opportunity to pursue meaningful discovery of the factual
issues on which prudence is decided. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 41 F.E.R.C.
at 62,205; United Gas Pipe Line Co., 41 F.E.R.C. at 62,059, 62,061 (Ordering
F). The
FERC has recognized that all of those facts are in the possession of the pipeline. United Gas
Pipe Line Co., 43 F.E.R.C. at 61,685.
197. Functionalization is ordinarily the first step in designing rates. Where a regulated
entity provides more than one service, such as natural gas pipelines that provide sales, transmission and storage, costs are functionally associated with each of these services to be billed in
the rate charged to customers in proportion to their demand for, or use of, that specific service.
198. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
199. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,339-40, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,781-84.
200. Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1028-30. The FERC had rejected proposals to
condition transmission access on take-or-pay relief on the ground that such a condition would
be unduly discriminatory and therefore violative of the NGA. See Order No. 436, supra note
5, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,465, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 31,565. The
court was unpersuaded.
Given that the Commission itself has identified the producer-pipeline contracts
as a primary cause of the problem that Order No. 436 is intended to cure, . . . it
eludes us why pipeline denial of access to producers that stand on the letter of
their contract rights [to take-or-pay] should be viewed as unduly discriminatory.
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While this approach, called "crediting," is an encouraging sign that the
FERC is no longer totally ignoring the need to take action on take-or-pay,
crediting is an indirect remedy that is proving to be cumbersome and thus
far ineffectual. 20 1 As long as the FERC does not go to the heart of the
problem, the take-or-pay contracts themselves, little reason exists to expect
that crediting alone will provide sufficient take-or-pay relief. To the contrary, a rational producer would eschew the complexities of crediting and
the mere potential of increased sales, and instead simply sue to enforce the
high price and high take-or-pay requirements in their contracts. 202 Recent
precedents suggest that producer suits will be successful and offer greater
rewards 20 3 than are possible from open-access transmission in the currently
depressed gas sales market. 2°4
A. Starting at the Beginning by Determining the Magnitude of Take-orPay Costs that Are Recoverable in Rates

The thrust of the FERC's Orders No. 380 and No. 436 was to enhance
competition in natural gas markets. In Order No. 380 the FERC freed the
pipeline customers to purchase gas more flexibly, on a least-cost basis from
suppliers other than their traditional pipeline supplier. 20 5 In Order No. 436
the FERC then provided pipeline customers with expanded access to the
pipelines qua open-access transporters that stand ready to transport gas
purchased from the nontraditional sources. 20 6 While these objectives are
copacetic in themselves, the FERC's myopic focus on changing the contractual obligations of downstream purchasers to their traditional interstate
824 F.2d at 1028-30; see also Doane, supra note 4, at 50.
201. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 42 F.E.R.C. at 61,872-73 (1988) (discussing difficulties in implementing crediting).
202. The Associated Gas Distributors'panel recognized that a producer's incentive to credit
is the ability to obtain transmission access and thereby pursue "entirely new market opportunities" to make sales directly to distribution and end-use markets. 824 F.2d at 1029 (emphasis
added). It is far from certain whether a mere opportunity will override the apparently greater
likelihood that the producer will succeed on a breach of contract claim while retaining its gas
for future sales. Recognizing that producers may well resist for this reason, the court complained that the FERC "seems to confuse the pipelines' incentive to renegotiate contracts with
their ability to do so." 824 F.2d at 1024 (emphasis in original); cf ConsolidatedEdison, 823
F.2d at 640 ("whole purpose of take-or-pay contracts is to give producers the same benefit
whether or not the gas in question actually leaves the ground"). The producer bar is buoyed
by recent successes, including judgments for anticipatory repudiation when a pipeline's depressed sales market demonstrates that it will neither be able too take gas, nor be able to pay.
E.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., No. 85-09329 (D. Ct. Harris County,
Tex. 1988) ($356.2 million jury verdict against pipeline for anticipatory repudiation). See generally Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, supra note 4, at 198-201, 256 (urging producers to litigate
take-or-pay claims, including claims for anticipatory repudiation).
203. See generally D. JOHN, E. HENGERER & P. ESPOSITO, NATURAL GAS CONTRACTS
§§ 12.003-.0012 (Thompson Pub. Group) (updating judgments in take-or-pay litigation).
204. See id.See generally Medina, McKenzie & Daniels, supra note 4.
205. See Order No. 380, supra note 23, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,779, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,958-59; Order No. 436, supra note 5, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,411, [Regs.
Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 31,470; see also supra text accompanying
notes 22-38.
206. Order No. 436, supra note 5, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,429, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 31,504; see supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
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pipeline suppliers has caused the FERC to overlook entirely the interrelated
contractual obligations of pipelines to both their downstream purchasers and
upstream gas producers. The pipelines entered into these contractual commitments in reliance on the regulatory status quo existing before Orders No.
380 and No. 436. That status quo encompassed the pipelines' statutory and
contractual obligation to satisfy the demands of downstream markets, not
only for transportation services, but also for gas sales on demand. 20 7 The
status quo further encompassed the pipelines' corresponding need to keep
enough gas supply under contract with gas producers at the wellhead or
with other pipelines to fulfill the statutory certificate requirement to supply
gas on demand to downstream purchasers. By reducing downstream purchasers' commitments to the pipelines as gas merchants while increasing the
pipelines' obligations to serve as transporters independent of sales, the
FERC undercut the longstanding contractual bases for existing wellhead
contractual relations between the gas pipelines and their producer-suppliers. 20 8 The first step in devising a lawful and nonretroactive solution to pipeline take-or-pay liability should therefore start with the wellhead contracts.
1. FERC's Jurisdiction to Modify or Invalidate Wellhead Contract Terms
Under conventional ratemaking principles, the FERC could address wellhead contracts from two angles. First, the FERC could examine whether
the regulated gas pipelines were prudent in entering the gas supply commitments that have produced take-or-pay liabilities. Payments under imprudent contractual commitments are unjust and unreasonable, in violation of
sections 4 and 5 of the NGA, and are therefore not eligible for recovery in
rates. 20 9 Second, the FERC can address whether contractual take-or-pay
requirements exert an unjust and unreasonable effect on rates under section
5 of the NGA, or whether nonrecoupable take-or-pay payments violate max207. See Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1016 n.18 ("In some cases [the pipelines']
commitments were not freely entered into, but are the product of Commission orders under
NGA § 7(a) that the pipeline extend service to a particular customer"); but cf supra note 13.
Pre-Order No. 380 regulation under the NGA had actually strengthened the monopoly power
of the pipelines as gas merchants. See Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1017; Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 2, at 24.
208. See Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1027 (citing Carpenter, Jacoby & Wright,

Adapting to Change in Natural Gas Markets, in

ENERGY, MARKETS & REGULATION, ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF M.A. ADELMAN 1 (1986) (discussing evolution of natural gas pipelines' expo-

sure to risk)); see also Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 2, at 35-37.
209. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c-717d (1982). "The Commission has the continuing responsibility
under the Natural Gas Act to adjudicate the reasonableness of any rate or charge and to insure
that all rates and charges are supported by only prudently incurred costs." Metzenbaum v.
Columbia Gas Trans. Corp., 2 F.E.R.C. 63,020, at 65,108 (1978) (emphasis added); accord
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959). The NGA requirement
that natural gas companies incur costs prudently comprises a pipeline's obligation "to consider
the effect of its purchases [at the wellhead] on the marketability of its gas .... " Office of
Consumers' Counsel, Ohio v. FERC, 783 F.2d 206, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Consequently, takeor-pay costs that are attributable to pipeline purchases of too much or too costly gas may not
be eligible for rate recovery. On appeal of Order No. 436, the FERC assured the court that the
pipelines would be allowed to bill only "prudently incurred" take-or-pay costs to customers
downstream. Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1027. Conversely, gas that is not marketable solely by reason of regulatory changes should not be similarly excluded from rate recovery.
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imum lawful ceiling prices under section 504 of the NGPA. 210
No one, including the FERC itself, has questioned its statutory authority
to pursue the first approach. In fact, the FERC recognized in Order No. 500
that it is "undoubtedly true that some pipelines imprudently entered into
'2 1
contracts incorporating both high prices and high take-or-pay levels."
The FERC, nevertheless, has simply argued that prudence investigations are
difficult and, for that reason, the FERC has effectively declined its statutory
mandate to pursue them. 2 12 In any event, few, if any, would argue that factspecific prudence inquiries into the purchasing practices of individual pipelines present a meaningful regulatory vehicle for resolving the industry-wide
21 3
take-or-pay problem.
By contrast, the FERC and others, predominantly gas producers, have
challenged the FERC's authority to act directly against wellhead contracts,
arguing that the NGPA deprived the FERC of its NGA section 5 jurisdiction over NGPA transactions. 21 4 The FERC has also asserted that it is not
the province of the regulator to interfere in the contractual commitments
between pipelines and producers. 21 5 These arguments, like the FERC's refusal to investigate prudence, are not supportable and cannot withstand judicial review. Particularly surprising is the sanctity that the FERC now
purports to attach to contracts between producers and pipelines so soon after
the FERC found no obstacle to rewriting minimum bills out of pipeline
210. See supra note 127. For a discussion of the NGPA's maximum lawful prices for various categories of gas, see generally Note, supra note 2.
211. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,336, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,778; see Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 38, 38 F.E.R.C.
at 61,726.
212. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,343, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,787-88; Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 38, 38 F.E.R.C.
at 61,728 ("[t]he Commission seeks to avoid ... lengthy hearings [on] . . . prudence"); see
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,174, at 61,632 (1988) (ordering direct billing
while indefinitely deferring § 5 relief). Indeed, the FERC has gone so far as to threaten to
impose discriminatory rates on customers who are unwilling to forego their statutory protection against imprudently incurred rates and charges. See United Gas Pipe Line Co., 42
F.E.R.C. 61,195, at 61,685 (1988) ("litigating parties should be aware that they assume these
risks when they raise the prudence issue").
213. Even where well-founded, prudence challenges are costly and difficult to prosecute.
They have largely been pursued as a last resort by customers frustrated by the FERC's long
inaction on the take-or-pay problem. See Doane, supra note 4, at 20.
214. Dicta in a footnote to the Associated Gas Distributorsdecision endorsed this proposition. 824 F.2d at 1027 n.30 (citing Pennzoil v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 380-83 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982)). Section 5 authority with respect to contracts for NGPApriced gas was not at issue in Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1022 n.25; see also Order
No. 436-A, supra note 5, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,235 n.42, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C.
Stats. & Regs. at 31,660 n.42 (the FERC did not address issue), nor was it decided in Pennzoil,
in which the court simply determined that state contract law, and not FERC regulation, governed price escalation provisions up to the level of applicable MLPs. 645 F.2d at 383 ("[c]ourt
affirms the use of general contract law in determining not to preclude area rate clause escalation generally as a matter of contract law").
215. E.g., Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1026 (quoting FERC Brief at 130-31), 102730 (summarizing and rejecting the FERC's excuses for choosing not to address producer-pipeline contracts under NGA § 5). On remand, the FERC did not take § 5 action, but simply
invoked its NGA and NGPA jurisdiction to order natural gas pipelines to submit more data
on problem take-or-pay contracts.
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supply contracts in Order No. 380. Nor is the FERC's veneration of wellhead contracts consistent with its fiat in Order No. 436 converting pipelines
into open-access carriers, thereby abrogating the pipelines' statutory and
216
contractual status as contract carriers.
The FERC's jurisdiction to modify wellhead contracts arises primarily
from section 5 of the NGA. If the FERC determines that a contract affecting rates is unjust and unreasonable under the Act, section 5 requires the
FERC to "determine the just and reasonable ... contract to be thereafter
observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order. ' 2 17 With specific
reference to take-or-pay terms in wellhead contracts, the FERC previously
found that the effect of high percentage take-or-pay obligations on rates,
even if the obligations were not unreasonable when entered into, but under
present circumstances have become "unjust and unreasonable, unduly discriminatory and preferential. ' 2 18 That finding ultimately resulted in the
FERC, with court approval, denying rate recovery of costs that a pipeline
incurred to settle liabilities under unjust and unreasonable take-or-pay con2t 9
tract terms.
Section 5 authority over contracts affecting rates extends to both contracts
covering price-regulated gas and contracts covering gas for which price has
been deregulated under the pricing structure in the NGPA. The enactment
of the NGPA in 1978 did not diminish that authority, which has been in
force since Congress enacted the NGA in 1938. For example, in Office of
Consumers' Counsel v. FERC,2 20 the D.C. Circuit affirmed the FERC's exercise of section 5 jurisdiction over contracts for NGPA section 107 gas, which
is price deregulated under the NGPA, but then reversed the FERC's order
below for failing to implement a mandatory remedy under section 5 for contracts covering section 107 gas that had been found unjust and unreasonable. 22 1 Any view to the contrary, including dictum in the Associated Gas
Distributorsdecision, 222 is not supportable. 223 The issue is only of secondary
216. Noting the inconsistency between the FERC's aggressive regulation and abrogation of
pipeline-consumer contracts and its laissez-faire approach to the interdependent pipeline-producer contracts upstream, the Associated Gas Distributorscourt noted that "Order [No. 436]

effectively reduces pipeline ability to face down recalcitrant producers." 824 F.2d at 1024. On
remand, the court instructed the FERC that the most important restriction to be placed on its
deregulatory inclinations was recognition that "producers' access to transportation ... is itself
dependent on government [regulatory] intervention." Id. at 1027.
217. 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1982); see American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925,
940-41 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974).
218. Office of Consumer's Counsel, Ohio v. FERC, 783 F.2d 206, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(quoting Columbia Gas Trans. Corp., Opinion No. 204, 26 F.E.R.C. 61,034, at 61,120
(1984)).
219. Id. The court emphasized the need to remedy high-cost take-or-pay obligations:

[T]he effect of these [high-cost take-or-pay] provisions under present conditions
is ... harmful to Columbia's customers who stand to lose markets because of
fuel switching and unfair to consumers who must bear the cost. It is discriminatory to low-cost gas producers whose production is cut back. It is potentially
harmful to Columbia itself.
Id. at 236 n.54 (quoting Columbia Gas Trans. Corp., 26 F.E.R.C. at 61,120).
220. 783 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
221. Id. at 233, 235-36.
222. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. Ironically, that dictum has eclipsed the
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importance since available evidence, and the FERC's own findings indicate
that most of the pipelines' current take-or-pay liabilities arise from contracts
2 24
that are jurisdictional under the NGA.
That many wellhead contracts currently require a section 5 remedy is apparent from the FERC's own findings underlying the Order No. 500 direct
bill:
The take-or-pay problem currently affecting the natural gas industry
appears to be the vestige of an era of non-competitive conditions in wellhead markets. Many problem take-or-pay contracts were negotiated in
the years immediately following enactment of the NGPA (roughly 1979
through Mid-1982), which were characterized by pervasive market discontrary holding of Office of Consumers' Council, in the minds of certain commentators. See,
e.g., Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 2, at 41. This is plainly contrary to the law: one
panel of the court cannot overrule the recent holding of another panel. United States v. Doe,
730 F.2d 1529, 1531 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Brewster v. Commissioner, 607 F.2d 1369, 1373
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979). Due to the "labyrinthine" breadth of the Associated Gas Distributors decision, one judge from the panel reiterated the narrow holding, which
simply affirmed open access absent CD reductions, and refused to be bound by the rest of the
opinion's "loose language and stray observations." 824 F.2d at 1044 (Mikva, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Consistent with the Office of Consumers' Counsel
decision, a second panel of the D.C. Circuit refused to be bound by the Associated Gas Distributors dictum: "The initial panel clearly assumed, without question or objection from any
party, that in imposing remedies under Section 5 FERC had the power to modify ... illegal
take-or-pay provisions. The... footnote in Associated Gas Distribs. is clearly dictum and it in
no way affects the law of this case." Office of Consumers' Counsel, Ohio v. FERC (OCC I1),
826 F.2d 1136, 1139 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
223. Section 601(a)(1) of the NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3431(a)(1), removed the FERC's NGA
jurisdiction over first sales of "nonjurisdictional" gas and over the seller or purchaser that
would otherwise attach "solely by reason of any first sale of such natural gas." Id. That
diminution in jurisdiction over price in first sales did not otherwise diminish the FERC's § 5
authority over contracts affecting rates. Construing the parallel provision of the FPA, the
Supreme Court held precisely this in FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 281 (1976) ("The
rules, practices or contracts 'affecting' the jurisdictional rate are not themselves limited to the
jurisdictional context."). Indeed, the contrary, which would negate § 5 jurisdiction over "nonjurisdictional" first sales under the NGPA, would also negate Order No. 436's open-access,
transmission in connection with transmission of "nonjurisdictional gas." Order No. 436, however, was plainly not so circumscribed. It is well-settled that the FERC is empowered to
exercise its jurisdiction even when to do so results in indirect regulation of subjects over which
the FERC has no direct jurisdiction. See, e.g., FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S.
621 (1972) (FPC has power under NGA to regulate pipeline's curtailments of sales, including
nonjurisdictional direct sales, even though such action has the effect of overriding private sales
contracts for nonjurisdictional transactions); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.,
365 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1961) (FPC has power under NGA to deny transportation certificate for a
nonjurisdictional direct sale on the ground that the price is excessive, even though the effect of
denying a certificate is to regulate indirectly the price for a direct sale, over which FPC has no
jurisdiction); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 635, 646-47 (1945) (FPC has power
under NGA to take into consideration a pipeline's rates for nonjurisdictional direct sales when
computing rates for jurisdictional sales.). In Mississippi Indus. v. FERC, 808 F.2d 1525 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 501, 9 L. Ed. 2d 499 (1987), the D.C. Circuit recently held that
the FERC acted within its authority when it modified a contract pursuant to § 206 of the FPA
(the counterpart of NGA § 5), even though its action affected generating facilities, over which
the FERC has no jurisdiction, 808 F.2d at 1543, and even though its action had some impact
on state regulation, into which the FERC is not permitted to intrude. Id. at 1547.
224. See INGAA, supra note 3, at 1; see also Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1027-28
("bulk of high-cost 'problem' contracts without 'market-outs' may be those entered into prior
to 1982 involving offshore gas," which is under continuous NGA jurisdiction); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. FERC, 823 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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orders including high prices for new and unregulated gas reserves....
The large and growing take-or-pay liability of the pipelines is a source
of continuing market disorder which is at odds with the establishment of
market-responsiveprices and the unbundling of naturalgas services that
the Commission has endeavored to foster through Order Nos. 380, 436,
and 451.225

Recently, the courts have twice recognized that the noncompetitive effect
of these problem wellhead contracts has been magnified by Orders No. 380
and No. 436, as well as other recent FERC initiatives to promote competition in gas sales markets. For example, in vacating and remanding the
FERC's revised policy on when it will grant authority to abandon certified
wellhead gas supply commitments between producers and pipelines, the
court in ConsolidatedEdison Co. v. FERC 226 observed that "the take-or-pay
contracts problem will be exacerbated, not mitigated, by the various deregulatory maneuvers in which the [FERC] is engaged. ' 227 Because of the
FERC's failure to address the take-or-pay implications of its new abandonment policy, the court found that the new rule fell short of reasoned decisionmaking and remanded the case to the FERC for action on take-or228
pay.
These findings that high-percentage take-or-pay contracts are noncompetitive and against the public interest are virtually interchangeable with the
FERC's findings that it successfully relied on in Order No. 380 to relieve
pipeline customers from paying the variable-cost minimum commodity bills
contained in pipeline tariffs. Indeed, most of the specific findings concerning
the effects of variable-cost minimum commodity bills in Order No. 380 are
equally true of high percentage take-or-pay terms in wellhead contracts.
Just as the minimum bills immunized pipelines and their suppliers from
market risk, 229 take-or-pay protects producers by forcing pipelines and,
under the retroactive direct bill, downstream purchasers to pay producers
for gas at prices that are not marketable. 230 Take-or-pay hinders the ability
of pipelines to obtain gas supply on a least-cost basis, 231 just as the FERC
225.

Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 38, 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,726 (emphasis added);

see generally Threadgill, supra note 16 (arguing that pipeline take-or-pay liability is result of
producer abuses).
226. 823 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
227. Id. at 642; accord Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 205 (5th Cir.
1988) ("These orders [No. 380 and No. 436] essentially removed the gas consumers' obligation
to take high-priced gas from pipelines but did not relieve the pipelines' take-or-pay obligations

to producers."); cf Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,336, [Regs. Preambles 19861987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,777.
228. 823 F.2d at 641-43.
229. Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1114 (1986); see Note, supra note 23, at 144-45.
230. Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1021; see Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, supra

note 4, at 188 ("take-or-pay ...assign[s] the risk of a deteriorating natural gas market to the
pipeline.").
231. In fact, take-or-pay in the current market has a more harmful effect on gas consumers
than minimum commodity bills since it protects higher-than-market wellhead prices, Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1021; Consolidated Edison, 823 F.2d at 641-42; Order No. 500,

supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,338, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at
30,779. The evidence against minimum commodity bills, by contrast, simply demonstrated
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found that pipeline minimum bills denied gas to downstream purchasers on
a least-cost basis. 232 Further, like the variable-cost minimum commodity
bill, take-or-pay requirements are not necessarily cost-based, since they permit producers to recover costs not incurred by them and potentially allow
233
them to recover multiple times for the same gas.
Because of these similarities, no reason exists why section 5 should require
complete abrogation of the contractual minimum bill agreements between
pipelines and their customers and yet not require a parallel modification in
the interdependent gas supply contracts between pipelines and producers.
The FERC has nevertheless refused or indefinitely deferred any direct section 5 remedy. 234 In Order No. 500, the FERC simply committed itself to
study the issue further by collecting new data. 235 Further study is hardly
warranted. Findings in Orders No. 380, No. 436 and No. 500, supported by
ample data and other evidence, compel prompt section 5 relief, thereby diminishing the perceived need for less direct remedies, such as unlawful retroactive rates.
Perhaps the most effective regulatory remedy under section 5 would be the
least intrusive. The FERC could simply order that all wellhead contracts
to
containing minimum take requirements violative of section 5 be modified 236
include an economic-out clause. The economic-out or. "market-out,"
which has become common in gas supply contracts during the past four to
five years, grants the purchaser a once-exercisable right to determine the
price at which it could market a minimum take level, within the parameters
of the post Orders No. 380 and No. 436, gas markets, without incurring
that they reduced pipeline risk by limiting customer flexibility or, in the case of variable cost
minimum commodity bills, could allow pipelines to recover costs never actually paid by them.

See Order No. 380, supra note 23, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,779, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C.
Stats. & Regs. at 30,959. Judged against the primary purpose of the NGA to protect customers from exploitation at the hands of the natural gas companies, Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public

Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1958); California Gas Producers Assoc. v. FPC, 421 F.2d
422, 428 (9th Cir. 1970) ("primary duty ... is the protection of the consumer"), high-cost

take-or-pay contract terms are arguably more in need of a regulatory remedy than were minimum commodity bills.
232. Order No. 380, supra note 23, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,783, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985]

F.E.R.C. Stats. &,Regs. at 30,964.
233. This is particularly true with respect to nonrecoupable take-or-pay prepayments,
under which the producer-seller is paid, receives time value for the storage service it effectively
provides, and is allowed to sell the gas again. Nonrecoupable prepayments are discussed infra
text accompanying notes 240-70.

234. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,341, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,784. Order No. 380, supra note 23, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,789, [Regs.
Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,972.
235. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,341 [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]

F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,784.
236. An economic-out provision in a gas contract "permits the purchaser to rescind contracts for deregulated natural gas if prices of competitive fuel drop to the extent that the distributors of the gas cannot compete."

H. WILLIAMS & C.

MEYERS,

supra note 4, at 295. A

market-out provision "permit[s] a pipeline purchaser to lower [the] price [it pays] if market
conditions dictate" and allows the gas seller "to reject the lower price and have the pipeline
transport the gas to another buyer." Id. at 547. See generally Johnson, Natural Gas Sales
Contracts, 34 S.w. LEGAL FOUND. OIL & GAS INST. 83, 104 (1983); Smith & Billings, Taxation and FinancialReporting Regarding the Economic-Out Clause, 35 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 115
(1986).
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take-or-pay liability. The pipeline would then offer that price to the wellhead seller as a contract amendment. The seller, in turn, could either accept
the amendment or terminate the sales agreement, including the pipeline's
take-or-pay obligation, and endeavor to sell the gas elsewhere.
The virtue of this approach is that it would not require the regulator to
devise and impose specific new contract provisions. In response to exercise
of an economic-out, the parties would be free either to conform their contract to new market conditions or terminate their relationship. Creation of
this contractual mutuality in remedying the take-or-pay problem is essential
to its success. 237 Moreover, this approach conforms to the FERC's new Orto renegotider No. 451238 policy, which creates a one-time right for parties
239
ate wellhead prices that are still subject to price regulation.
2. Statutory Invalidation of Nonrecoupable Take-or-Pay
The FERC could also diminish the magnitude of the pipelines' apparent
take-or-pay exposure by strictly enforcing the maximum-lawful-price ceilings prescribed in title I of the NGPA and section 5 of the NGA to invalidate and enjoin nonrecoupable take-or-pay prepayments. With respect to
price-regulated gas, section 504(a) of the NGPA makes it "unlawful for any
person ... to sell natural gas at a first sale price in excess of any applicable
maximum lawful price under this Act.' 24 0 Section 2(20) defines a sale as
any "transfer for value. "' 24 1 Prepaid take-or-pay obligations that become
nonrecoupable 242 could, therefore, violate section 504(a).
237. See Pierce, Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 2, at 21-22 (instructing that preserving
mutuality is important to success of any program to remedy take-or-pay problem).
238. Ceiling Prices; Old Gas Pricing Structure, Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168 (June
18, 1986), [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,701, petition for review
docketed sub nom. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing, S.E., Inc., v. FERC, No. 86-4949 (5th
Cir. Dec. 15, 1986).
239. This is the "good faith" renegotiation rule, which allows producers and pipelines to
renegotiate the price terms of certain gas contracts, without regulatory imposition of prices up
to an MLP. Id., 51 Fed. Reg. 22,204-09, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs.
at 30,250-58. Order No. 451 revises the varying MLPs for so-called "old gas" under the
NGPA-viz., gas that remains subject to NGA price jurisdiction pursuant to NGPA §§ 104
and 106-and establishes an alternative ceiling price for those categories of gas. The good
faith renegotiation rule pertains to §§ 104 and 106 producer contracts containing indefinite
price escalation clauses. If the producer seeks escalation and is unable to nominate a price
acceptable to the purchaser up to the MLP, the producer is granted abandonment and a right
to terminate the contract. It can sell the gas elsewhere, subject to a first refusal right vested in
the erstwhile purchaser's firm sales customers. See id., 51 Fed. Reg. 22,204, [Regs. Preambles
1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,210-12, 30,250-52. The purchaser is allowed to respond to a producer requested escalation by nominating a new price on all NGPA vintages of
gas covered by a multi-vintage contract containing the escalation provision. Id., 51 Fed. Reg.
22,204, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,250. The latter right of the
purchaser, according to the FERC "balance[s] the negotiating rights among the parties." Id.
240. 15 U.S.C. § 3414(a) (1982).
241. Id. § 3301(20). A "first sale" subject to MLPs is, in turn, defined as "any sale of any
volume of natural gas-(i) to any interstate pipeline or intrastate pipeline" which is the first
such sale. Id. § 3301(21)(A).
242. See supra note 108. Under Order No. 500, prepayments themselves are not eligible for
the retroactive direct bill. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,345, [Regs. Preambles
1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,791; Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 42 F.E.R.C.
61,175, at 61,627 (1988); proposed 18 C.F.R. § 2.104(g) ("This section ... is not intended to
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Recently, three FERC Commissioners rejected this interpretation of title I
of the NGPA in ANR Pipeline Co. v. Wagner & Brown, 243 which had been

pending before the FERC since 1983. The FERC's belated decision came in
response to the Fifth Circuit's primary jurisdiction referral, in which the
court gave the FERC six months to decide the issue, if it was going to decide
at all. 244 The FERC held that when the purchaser takes no prepaid gas,
there is no sale for purposes of the NGPA's first sale definition. 24 5 When the
purchaser later takes part, but not all, of the prepaid gas, however, a first
sale occurs, but the prepayment is "attributable solely to gas taken pursuant
to the make-up provision of the contract" and "[c]onsequently .

.

. repre-

sent[s] a cost of gas only to the extent gas is made up."' 24 6 On the issue of
whether a sale occurs, the FERC added that the prepayments are like free or
discounted transportation services that a pipeline provides to a producer in
connection with a sale, independent of the first-sale price. The FERC held
in an earlier decision that, for purposes of the NGPA, free or discounted
transportation does not constitute part of the transfer for value underlying a
sale. 247 More generally, the FERC explained in Wagner & Brown that it
could not construe nonrecoupable prepayments as part of the first-sale price
because of pre-NGPA practice under area-rate price ceilings and Congress's
silence on the issue in the NGPA and its legislative history. 248
None of these explanations is compelling. What is the nonrecouped prepayment when the pipeline takes no gas if it is not part of the first-sale price?
Proponents of nonrecoupable prepayments had argued that the prepayments
were reservation or storage fees, liquidated damages or consideration for an
option. 249 The FERC simply held that it was not a sale. 2 50 Given the importance of the issue and the potential for ameliorating the take-or-pay problem, the FERC should have given a significantly more thoughtful answer.
The FERC cannot logically escape the illegality of nonrecoupable take-orpay obligations on price-regulated gas simply by characterizing the prepayment obligations as a producer remedy in the form of inventory or storage
affect [take-or-pay] prepayments .... "). Prepayments continue to be eligible for capitalization

in rate base for recovery on (but not of) the prepaid amount. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.,
42 F.E.R.C. at 61,627-28 ("[P]repayments are ... a rate base item. These are amounts spent
for which a service will be provided in the future."); 18 C.F.R. pt. 201 (1988) (Account No.
165). The threat that many existing and future prepayments will prove nonrecoupable in current market conditions underlies the need to renegotiate the take-or-pay contracts. Since settlement payments made in connection with renegotiation are eligible for direct billing, some
pipelines have threatened to make settlement payments, which are recoverable under the direct

bill, to extinguish prepayment liabilities even where recoupment is possible and would possibly
prove more economical. See Request for Rehearing of Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., Tennessee
Gas Pipeline Co., Nos. RP86-119-000, at 29-32 (filed March 9, 1988).

243. 44 F.E.R.C. 61,057 (1988) (3-1 decision), petition for reh'gfiled Aug. 15, 1988.
244. 837 F.2d at 206.
245. 44 F.E.R.C. at 61,157.
246. Id.
247. Id. (citing Indicated Producers, 22 F.E.R.C.

61,013, at 61,021 (1983), afJd sub nom.

Texas E. Trans. Corp. v. FERC, 769 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1967
(1986)).

248. Id. at 61,157-58.
249. Id. at 61,156.

250. Id. at 61,157.
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charges as opposed to first-sale payments. The producer has a complete
remedy for inventory and storage costs caused by purchaser takes below
minimum contract quantity without having to retain nonrecoupable prepayments. The available remedy is the producers' unchallenged right to retain
the time value of any take-or-pay prepayment. 251 Moreover, once the prepaid gas becomes nonrecoupable, by definition the producer no longer holds
any gas for which an inventory or storage fee should be charged.
The characterization of nonrecoupable prepayments as liquidated damages is subject to attack on at least two grounds. First, when a purchaser
takes no gas at all, the producer can sell elsewhere whatever gas it has. The
existence of any nonmitigable damage is therefore questionable. Second, a
court could deem the prepayment, characterized as a liquidated damage
award, to be an unlawful penalty, 252 particularly since the damage award
has such an enormous impact on a regulated service invested with the public
interest.
The characterization of nonrecoupable prepayments as consideration for
an option is likewise untenable. To purchase an option is to buy the right to
decide later whether to purchase and pay for the optioned item. Under takeor-pay, a pipeline may or may not take the gas in the future, but it must take
or pay for the full purchase price of between sixty to 100 percent of the
contracted gas reserves or deliverability. Options are priced according to the
length of time they are open, the normal fluctuation in price of the optioned
item, the prevailing interest rate, and other factors entirely independent of
the value of the optioned item. 253 Indeed, the cost of the option is generally
251. Take-or-pay prepayments resemble interest-free loans to producer-sellers. The producer-seller realizes the full time value of the contract price of the gas that he is holding in the
ground until it is actually taken or "recouped." The retained interest or time value is, in effect,
the inventory or storage charge collected by the seller. The Associated Gas Distributorsmajority apparently overlooked this time value when it opined in dictum that characterizing a prepayment as an NGPA first sale was "improbable" because
Congress must have been aware that producer and pipelines would incorporate
these [NGPA price] ceilings into long-term contracts, and that the contracts
would include remedies for producers. Obviously the remedial rights would
constitute value. If any such value put into breach of the NGPA a contract
nominally at the NGPA ceiling, the NGPA would provide a most uncertain
guide.
824 F.2d at 1022 n.26.
252. "[I]n the light of the circumstances existing when [a] contract was [entered]," if the
liquidated damage "amount agreed upon is 'unconscionable' or is disproportionate to the value
of the performance promised and the consideration paid, the sum fixed will be called a penalty
and the agreement to pay it will not be enforced." A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1063, at 362 (1963 & Kaufman Supp. 1984). For a court to enforce liquidated damages, it
must find some relationship between foreseeable damages and the liquidated amount. Id. Similarly, the UCC provides that "[a] term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as
a penalty." U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1982); see Bogatz v. Case Catering Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 1052,
383 N.Y.S.2d 535 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1976) (clause holding buyer liable for full contract price in
event of cancellation held unconscionable). Nonrecoupable prepayments, therefore, may not
be enforceable as liquidated damages clauses. The prepaid amounts do not attempt to provide
contractually for reasonably foreseeable damages and may be perceived arguably "unreasonably large." But see Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, supra note 4, at 220-22 (rejecting penalty
argument, but not addressing nonrecoupable prepayments specifically).
253. See W.E SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 364-76 (1978) (explaining option valuation and
setting out the Black-Scholes model, which uses such factors as interest rates, price fluctuation
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not stated as part of the purchase price (although it can, depending on its
size, affect the purchase price), but is stated instead as the value required by
the seller for keeping the optioned item off the market for a period of time,
and the amount the buyer is willing to risk to own the right to make a future
decision to purchase. By contrast, take-or-pay prepayments are applied to
the purchase price of any gas later taken within the recoupment period, are
set by reference to the price of the gas, and reflect a current decision by a
pipeline to commit itself to the purchase of gas it may never even take. An
option holder only becomes similarly committed after it exercises the option.
In short, the two are essentially dissimilar.
The FERC's own analogy in Wagner & Brown, comparing a take-or-pay
prepayment to a "prepayment of a lease, '' 254 actually seems to belie the option characterization. A lease prepayment ordinarily is a prepayment of all
or a portion of the total lease cost for the commodity, property, or service
leased, with the lessor getting the time value of the prepayment. The prepayment on a lease is therefore
not an option payment, but is instead a pay255
ment for the lease itself.
Nor is the FERC's reasoning made more accessible by reference to its
earlier finding that free or discounted transportation services are not part of
a first-sale price. 256 Transportation is an in-kind transfer of value that is not
ordinarily related to the per-unit price of gas. By contrast, nonrecoupable
prepayments are monetary transactions expressly valued as a percentage of
the per-unit price of gas. 257 In these respects, nonrecoupable prepayments
are not equivalent to transportation service that is provided in connection
with a sale of gas. The prepayments are instead fundamentally similar to
prepayments that pipelines paid to producers in connection with the advance
payments program. 2 58 The advance payments program, which was an outand length of the option in order to arrive at a value); Corbin supra note 252, 259, at 459-60;
see also J. CCOX & M, RUBENSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS 33-39 (1985).
254. 44 F.E.R.C. at 61,157.

255. The FERC's prepaid lease analogy actually seems to buttress the dissent of Commissioner Stalon in the FERC's Wagner & Brown decision. Commissioner Stalon rejected the
majority's interpretation of NGPA § 101(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 3311(b)(4) (1982), as confining a
first sale to situations in which the payment for and receipt of gas occur in the same month.
Under that definition, prepayments that become nonrecoupable at the end of a five-year make-

up period would never be part of the price paid. As Commissioner Stalon instructed,
§ 101(b)(4) relates to the price ceilings themselves, which can change from month to month.

44 F.E.R.C. at 61,158-59. Prepayments, however, like long-term lease prepayments, are not
discrete monthly occurrences unrelated to the price of what is leased or purchased. Moreover,
the FERC's earlier proposed rulemaking including gas advance payments in the first sale price
for NGPA purposes squarely contradicts the FERC's current interpretation of the reference to
"month" in NGPA § 101(b)(4). Id. at 61,159-3 to -4; see infra note 260 and accompanying
text.

256. 44 F.E.R.C. at 61,157.
257. See supra note 4.
258. See Accounting and Rate Treatment of Advances Included in Account No. 166, Ad-

vances for Gas Exploration, Development and Production, Order No. 499, 50 F.P.C. 2111
(1973) (governing contracts executed between Jan. 1, 1974, and Dec. 31, 1975); Accounting
and Rate Treatment of Advance Payments Included in Account 166, Advance Payments for

Gas Development and Production, Order No. 465, 48 F.P.C. 1550 (1972) (extending advance
payments program to Dec. 31, 1973); Accounting and Rate Treatment of Advance Payments

to Suppliers for Exploration and Lease Acquisition of Gas Producing Properties, Order No.
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growth of the gas deliverability shortages of the 1970s, 259 authorized pipelines to fund development of gas reserves for later delivery. In 1980 the
FERC concluded that, since pipelines could easily manipulate advance payments to evade price ceilings, the payments should be deemed part of the
260
price paid in a first sale.
Finally, the FERC's reference to area rates and congressional silence
proves nothing. The legality of nonrecoupable take-or-pay prepayments apparently never arose in the context of area rates, and the negative pregnant
that the FERC divined in Congress's silence regarding these prepayments in
the NGPA 26 1 is unconvincing. The inability of pipelines to recoup prepayments did not become a significant problem until the gas markets changed in
the early 1980s, well after Congress deliberated on and passed the NGPA in
1978.262 FERC's interpretation of Congress's silence further runs afoul of
statutory construction rules. In section 110 of the NGPA Congress expressly addressed two categories of gas supply-related costs that can be
charged in excess of the MLP: state severance taxes and certain productionrelated costs. 2 6 3 By contrast, take-or-pay as well as producer debt service
costs, storage and inventory costs, options or liquidated damages are nowhere mentioned. Thus, under the rule of expresio unius est exclusio alter441, 46 F.P.C. 1178 (1971) (governing advance payments contracts executed between Nov. 10,
197 1, and Dec. 31, 1972); Accounting and Rate Treatment of Advance Payments to Suppliers
for Gas, and Amending F.P.C. Form No. 2, Order No. 410-A, 45 F.P.C. 135 (1971) (amending the treatment of advance payments governed by Order No. 410); Accounting and Rate
Treatment of Advance Payments to Suppliers for Gas and Amending F.P.C. Form No. 2,
Order No. 410, 44 F.P.C. 1142 (1970) (governing advances made pursuant to contracts entered
after Oct. 2, 1970).
259. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980).
260. Advance Payments under the NGPA of 1970, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 45
Fed. Reg. 28,345, 28,346 (Apr. 29, 1980), reprinted in [1980] F.E.R.C. Proposed Regs.
32,063, at 32,702-03. In response to the court's remand in Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., the
F.E.R.C. issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in which it concluded:
[T]he District of Columbia Court of Appeals indicated that advance payments
"provide a 'bonus' to producers in the amount of the interest factor, an amount
which is never refunded." The court found that this bonus effectively raised the
price of natural gas "above the regulatory ceiling." The Commission agrees;
without an appropriate adjustment, advance payments may allow producers to
circumvent the maximum lawful prices established under the NGPA.
Id. (footnote omitted). The FERC later withdrew the proposed rulemaking as unnecessary
because the subject of that docket-the advance payment program-no longer existed. Termination of Rulemaking Dockets, Order No. 354, 49 Fed. Reg. 1525 (Jan. 12, 1984), reprintedin
[Proposed Regs. 1982-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs.
32,364. The logic of the proposed
rulemaking and the applicability of that logic to nonrecoupable take-or-pay prepayments, however, remain compelling.
261. 44 F.E.R.C. at 61,158.
262. See Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1988);
Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 995-96; Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1151
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1114 (1986); Doane, supra note 4, at 18 ("take-or-pay
provisions ... were not a source of controversy .. .[until] middle to late 1970's"); Medina,
McKenzie & Daniel, supra note 4, at 189-92 ("During the 1980's, the take-or-pay clause began
to become significant to the pipeline."); Moody, The Natural Gas Industry After PartialDeregulation, 36 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N §§ 6.01, 6.06[3] (1985).
263. 15 U.S.C. § 3320; see also supra note 44 (discussing production-related costs that
NGPA expressly allows producers to recover in excess of price ceilings); see supra note 127.
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ius,2 6 4 nonrecoupable prepayments should not be exempt from an otherwise

applicable MLP. This is particularly appropriate if Congress did actually
consider the issue, as the FERC suggests in Wagner & Brown. 26 5
Even if the courts uphold the Wagner & Brown decision, nonrecoupable
prepayments remain vulnerable under NGA section 5.266 Viewed as a liquidated damage award, the penalty imposed is hardly just and reasonable. As
noted earlier, section 5 of the NGA, empowers the FERC to review and
remedy "any rate, charge ... or contract affecting such rate."'267 This mandate to insure that all rates and contracts affecting rates are just and reasonable extends to contract provisions governing the sale of gas to interstate
2 68
pipelines, whether the gas is price regulated or deregulated.
A FERC finding that nonrecoupable prepayments violate section 5 would
lessen the compulsion that pipelines feel to pay off take-or-pay obligations
before they become nonrecoupable. Prepaid gas would then remain dedicated to the purchaser who made the prepayment and producers could not
retain take-or-pay prepayments and sell the prepaid gas elsewhere, doublebilling for the same volumes. In order to free prepaid take-or-pay volumes
for another sale, the producer would in all likelihood have to remit the prepaid principal, thereby lessening the pipeline's take-or-pay burden. In sum,
the FERC could significantly reduce the magnitude of pipeline take-or-pay
liability without resorting to Order No. 500's retroactive direct bill if it invalidates nonrecoupable take-or-pay obligations.
B.

Minimizing Cost Shifts and the Potentialfor IntergenerationalInequity
Through Refunctionalization

Even though retroactive rates cannot effectively match past purchases
with current take-or-pay liabilities, it is not necessary to abandon altogether
the FERC's concern regarding pipelines shifting take-or-pay costs unfairly
between classes or generations of ratepayers. One FERC Commissioner, in
his policy alternative to Order No. 500's retroactive direct bill, recognized
that cost shifting can lawfully be mitigated by refunctionalizing 269 some portion of take-or-pay costs away from the conventional production function to
270
the transmission function.
264. See 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (Sands
4th ed. 1984).
265. 44 F.E.R.C. at 61,158 n.5; see also Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1022 n.26.

The FERC's assumption, however, is not persuasive; the legislative history of the NGPA suggests "political turmoil and compromise" and not concentration on discrete or then unapparent historical details. Note, Deregulation and Natural Gas Purchase Contracts:
Examination Through Neoclassical and Relational Contract Theories, 25 WASH. L.J. 43, 45
(1985) (citing Morgan & Paterson, The NaturalGas Policy Act of 1978: Four Years of Practice

and Two Years to Make Perfect, 71 KY. L. J. 105 (1982)); see also Note, supra note 2, at 113-16
(discussing congressional debate on NGPA).
266. 44 F.E.R.C. at 61,156-57 (FERC expressly disclaimed any decision under NGA § 5).
267. 15 U.S.C. § 717d (emphasis added); see supra note 217.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 217-24.
269. For a definition of functionalization, see supra note 197.
270. Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 38, 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,731-32 (Stalon, Comm'r,
alternative policy statement).
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The refunctionalization approach, which is permitted, but not required,
by Order No. 500,271 essentially starts with the same threshold premise as
the Order No. 500 retroactive direct bill. The premise is that the past decisions of certain customers to reduce or cease gas purchases from their traditional pipeline in response to the competitive purchase options created by
Orders No. 380 and No. 436 have contributed to the take-or-pay exposure
that the pipelines now confront. Many, although not all, of those customers
availed themselves of their enhanced flexibility under Order No. 380 to
purchase from nontraditional suppliers-wellhead sellers, brokers, or other
pipelines-and then used the traditional or some other pipeline as an Order
No. 436 open access carrier, to transport the nontraditional gas supply.
The alternative policy recognized that, under the conventional practice,
take-or-pay costs are recoverable only in the gas sales rates. Thus, customers who were most captive to the traditional pipeline supplier ended up paying. 272 By contrast, those customers who reduced or ceased purchases could
successfully shift onto those captives and later generations of sale customers
part or all of the take-or-pay costs to which their past purchasing decisions
contributed, according to the threshold premise. This result is moderated by
refunctionalizing some or all take-or-pay costs away from production to
transmission. Purchasers from nontraditional suppliers would then have to
contribute to take-or-pay costs whenever they contracted to have their nontraditional gas supplies transported by the traditional pipeline supplier or
some other transporter whose take-or-pay costs would similarly be
refunctionalized.
Refunctionalization has the added virtue of prodding gas producers to
moderate their take-or-pay claims. Since most producer wellhead revenue
for gas sold is net of transmission costs, 2 7 3 any increase in transmission expense occasioned by functionalizing take-or-pay costs to that service will ordinarily be offset, at least in part, by a reduction in the producers' netback
receipts for wellhead sales. The diminution in the netback receipt will gener271. See Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,341, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,784-85; see Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 42 F.E.R.C.
61,407, at 62,207-09 (1988) (discussing Order No. 500 proposal to recover 50% of pipeline's
take-or-pay in volumetric surcharge on total throughput).
272. Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 38, 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,731 (Stalon, Comm'r,
alternative policy statement). The resulting misallocation under this scenario lies at the heart
of the FERC's defense of past-purchase-deficiency billing. See supra text accompanying notes
167-78.
273. In Order No. 380-A, the FERC recognized the increasing orientation of gas markets
to netback wellhead pricing:
[The industry pricing] system is changing to a "net-back" pricing system similar
to the net-back system in oil markets. Under "net-back" pricing the wellhead
price is governed by the burner-tip price and not vice versa. In a net-back system price formation begins in the final demand markets. The need to clear the
final demand markets-that is, to equate available gas supply with gas demand,
which depends on the prices of the other fuels that customers can buy-determines gas prices in end-use markets ....
Order No. 380-A, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,269 (Aug. 6, 1984), [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985] F.E.R.C.
Stats. & Regs. 30,584, at 31,047 (adopting Statement of George R. Hall).
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ally be in proportion to the burden that producer take-or-pay demands impose on transporting pipelines.
Obviously, refunctionalization alone cannot reach all of the purchasers
who, according to the threshold premise, may have contributed to take-orpay liabilities. For example, erstwhile purchasers who have stopped gas
purchases altogether will not pay gas transmission rates burdened by refunctionalized take-or-pay costs. Nevertheless, refunctionalization would lawfully address the cost-shifting rationales put forward in support of the
retroactive direct bill in Order No. 500.
Since refunctionalization would mark a significant departure from longstanding FERC practice, its implementation would have to be accompanied
by substantial evidence showing refunctionalization to be reasonable under
the circumstances confronting the industry. 2 74 This legal requirement, however, is equally applicable to Order No. 500's departure from the longstanding regulatory practice of classifying all take-or-pay costs to the commodity
charge. To the extent the FERC now purports to have marshalled substantial evidence justifying Order No. 500, the FERC surely could rely on the
same evidence to validate an otherwise lawful departure in the form of
refunctionalization. Moreover, if the FERC were to impose a sunset provision limiting the duration of refunctionalization to a period long enough to
reduce appreciably existing and anticipated take-or-pay liability, the justification for the departure would likely be strengthened.
C. Reclassifying Take-or-Pay for Recovery in Whole or in Part in a Fixed
Demand Charge
Order No. 500 introduced two major departures from conventional rate
treatment of take-or-pay costs. One is the unlawfully retroactive billing
mechanism. The other, and potentially lawful, change is the reclassification
of take-or-pay costs from the commodity charge, recoverable against current
and future purchases, to a fixed charge, recoverable irrespective of gas
sales. 275 Reclassification itself does not require retroactive billing. The
FERC could implement reclassification, for example, in relation to a customer's current or future demand for gas, however measured, as opposed to
past purchases.

276

Reclassification of take-or-pay costs would have two primary effects.
First, once reclassified as fixed demand charges, take-or-pay costs could no
longer be avoided by a customer pursuing a least-cost purchasing strategy,
except to the extent the customer reduced its contractual demand entitlement to the pipelines' capacity. Second, the pipeline would attain greater
assurance that its customers would pay its take-or-pay costs since recovery
274. See supra note 191.
275. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
276. The FERC embraced a partial reclassification mechanism, in addition to a retroactive
past-purchase-deficiency mechanism, to bill part of Tennessee Gas Pipeline's take-or-pay settlement costs, but reversed itself on rehearing, holding that all take-or-pay direct bills must
conform to the wholly retroactive billing scheme of Order No. 500. Compare 42 F.E.R.C. at
61,629-30 with 43 F.E.R.C. at 61,928-32.
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would no longer be a function of the competitive marketability of the pipelines' gas cost.
Reclassification, with these results, is only potentially lawful, since, like
refunctionalization, it would mark a material departure from the FERC's
longstanding practice and would therefore have to be supported by substantial evidence that the departure was needed and reasonable. 277 Even to the
extent it could be supported, however, it should be embraced only to the
extent that the other take-or-pay remedies, such as prudence reviews, section
5 relief, enjoining recovery of nonrecoupable take-or-pay prepayments and
refunctionalization, are tried and proven ineffective. Reclassification is not a
desirable remedy because it strikes at the heart of both Orders No. 380 and
No. 436. By increasing the unavoidable fixed charges associated with obtaining gas supply, reclassification increases sunk costs while it lessens the
variable costs associated with the traditional pipeline's gas supply. As a result, reclassification stymies customer flexibility to pursue least-cost purchasing under Order No. 380. The system would force a customer who is
pursuing a rational strategy of minimizing variable costs to buy from the
traditional supplier, even at a greater total unit cost. Further, and perhaps
more harmful to Order No. 380's stated objective of creating a more compet27 8
itive gas sales market, reclassification strengthens the monopsony power
of the traditional pipeline gas supplier by protecting a greater proportion of
its gas supply cost against price competition from other pipelines, gas mar27 9
keters, or wellhead sellers.
This result would, in turn, compromise the objectives of, and even the
need for, Order No. 436's open-access transportation. If the FERC tilted
the economic preference in favor of purchases from the traditional pipeline's
gas supply, customers will commensurately reduce their demand for transmission access independent of gas sales. Customers will simply continue to
purchase gas and its transmission as a single tied or "bundled" service from
the traditional pipeline supplier.
The only possible competitive gain achieved by reclassifying take-or-pay
costs to a demand charge lies in the potential for forcing downstream customers, especially distribution companies and their local regulators, to reassess realistically the level of firm demand that they require. As noted
throughout this Article, a principal flaw in both Order No. 380 and No. 436
was the FERC's myopic focus on restructuring the contractual entitlements
of the pipelines without forcing corresponding reductions in the obligations
of pipelines to upstream producers and downstream distribution and end-use
customers. Increasing downstream fixed charges through reclassification
could indirectly force downstream purchasers to reevaluate how much contract demand they need and are willing to pay for. Achievement of even this
277. See supra note 191.
278. See Order No. 380, supra note 23, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778, [Regs. Preambles 1982-1985]

F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,958.
279. See Proposed Policy Statement, supra note 38, 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,731-32 (Stalon,
Comm'r, alternative policy statement).
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limited benefit, however, would require the FERC to use current and future
demand levels, and not past historical demand levels, as the basis for the
billing of take-or-pay costs. Order No. 500, however, expressly rejects billing based on any current level of demand in lieu of the retroactive past28 0
purchase-deficiency mechanism.
The slight indirect benefit of reclassification is probably outweighed by the
substantial competitive damage it would cause. In Order No. 500 the FERC
has already laid the ground work for a more direct and arguably more effective, prospective restructuring of the relation between pipeline suppliers and
their downstream customers. Pursuant to Order No. 500, the FERC is currently developing, in individual pipeline certificate proceedings, what is referred to as a gas inventory charge, or GIC. 281 Furthering the effort to untie
or "unbundle" charges for the utility services that pipelines provide, the
GIC would permit pipelines to charge downstream customers a separate
cost-based rate for the pipeline's cost to maintain gas deliverability (subject
to take-or-pay) in inventory ready to meet the downstream purchasers' peak
demand for gas supply. Unlike the minimum bill, stricken in Order No. 380
and in individual pipeline rate proceedings, the GIC would be cost-supported; 28 2 and, unlike a reclassified take-or-pay charge that admittedly could
not be matched directly with a customer's or class of customers' contract
demand or past purchases, 28 3 the GIC is intended to prorate and bill the
costs that each firm-sales customer chooses to impose on the pipeline by
reserving rights to differing levels of peak and nonpeak deliverability. As an
intended result, the downstream purchaser is confronted directly and in advance with the cost, including take-or-pay costs, that its demand profile imposes on the pipeline.
Coupled with Order No. 436's option entitling customers to convert their
280. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,343, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,787; see supra note 276.
281. Order No. 500, supra note 5, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,343, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,792-94. As described by the FERC, the new GIC would be a
separate or "unbundled" charge by which the pipelines could recover "currently for contracting for a gas supply to meet its customers' requirements." Id., 52 Fed. Reg. 30,346-47,
[Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,793. By authorizing the pipelines
to charge currently (before gas is sold) for their cost of standing ready to satisfy firm sales
demands, the FERC hopes to make "a pipeline's system supply customers more careful in
nominating.., demand." Id. However, because the GIC is designed to recover the pipelines'
future "costs of contractually committ[ed] gas service," see id., 52 Fed. Reg. 30,347, [Regs.
Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,794, it cannot alone alleviate the massive
take-or-pay liability already on the pipelines' books. Id. In its initial orders on GIC applications, the FERC has made it difficult for the pipelines to embrace GICs by requiring the pipelines to cease any Order No. 500 direct billing of past take-or-pay before the GIC can be
implemented to recover future costs of maintaining gas supply, including take-or-pay costs.
See Transwestern Pipeline Co., 44 F.E.R.C. 61,164, at 61,536 (1988); see Order No. 500, 52
Fed. Reg. 30,346, [Regs. Preambles 1986-1987] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,792 ("the pipeline may not recover take-or-pay or similar charges from suppliers by any other means" than
the GIC once implemented).
282. Compare Order No. 380, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,780-81, 22,786, [Regs. Preambles 19821985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. at 30,960, 30,969 with Transwestern Pipeline Co., 44 F.E.R.C.
at 61,538 (distinguishing minimum commodity bills and minimum take requirements from
GIC).
283. See supra note 57.
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contract demand from sales to transportation service, the GIC promises to
force downstream contract modifications that will reduce the downstream
sales obligations of pipelines roughly in proportion to. the contractual sales
expectations and revenues that the pipelines lost under Orders No. 380 and
No. 436. By contrast, reclassification would achieve similar downstream results, if at all, only through indirection and only if current and future, as
opposed to historical, demand levels were used as the basis for billing. Consequently, little reason exists to recommend reclassification as a take-or-pay
remedy.
V.

CONCLUSION

The emerging conflict between the FERC and the courts was precipitated
by the FERC's attempts since Congress enacted the NGPA to use unlawful
retroactive rates to remedy errors and oversights that have characterized the
FERC's piecemeal initiatives to promote competitive gas sales markets. The
FERC's retroactive take-or-pay remedy in Order No. 500 is misguided and
should be abandoned just as the court in Columbia rejected the retroactive
rate. Not only are the filed rate doctrine and rule against retroactive
ratemaking foundations of traditional ratemaking, they are also essential to
realization of the more competitive, partially deregulated, gas market that
the FERC hopes to achieve. In both highly regulated or competitive markets, parties to gas supply contracts, from wellhead to burnertip, must be
able to rely on, and plan around, known filed rates. If the FERC allows filed
rates to become retroactive moving targets, the markets will simply not be
able to function.
To abandon the filed rate doctrine and the rule against retroactive
ratemaking now in order to remedy the take-or-pay problems that were, in
part, caused and surely exacerbated by the FERC's deregulatory initiatives
is tantamount to throwing out the baby with the bath water. Resort to retroactive rates is all the more misguided since the FERC has authority to pursue the more effective take-or-pay remedies described here.

